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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Constitutions on Democratization: Cases of Hungary and Bulgaria 
 
Arolda Elbasani 
 
M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Hootan Shambayati 
 
 
This study seeks to analyze the correlation between constitutions and 
democratization by comparing the cases of Hungary and Bulgaria. It suggests that the 
democratic credentials of constitutions are dependent to the constitution–making factors 
and processes, constitutional design as well as the implementation process.  
Both countries under study have adopted new constitutions to cope with the 
process of democratization. The new constitutions became a crucial asset to 
democratization to the extent they were indispensable in structuring the new 
governments and spelling out a catalogue of basic rights.  They imparted the political 
systems with the fundamental characteristics of the democratic regimes, but lack of 
respect for  the rule of law among the governing elites puts into question the whole 
project of democratization.  
Thus, constitutions can induce institutional incentives that smooth the process of 
democratization, but they by themselves can not produce a workable democracy. 
Democratization is a multifaceted project, which extends beyond the constitutional 
impact. Respect for the rule of law seems to be the missing chain and the future 
challenge of democratization.  
 
Keywords: Constitution, Democratization, Eastern Europe,  Bulgaria, Hungary 
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ÖZET 
Anayasaların Demokratıkleşme Üzerindeki Etkileri: Macaristan ve Bulgaristan 
Durumları 
 
Arolda Elbasani 
Master, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assistant Prof. Hootan Shambayati 
 
Bu çalışma anayasalar ve demokratikleşme arasındaki ilişkiyi, Macaristan ve 
Bulgaristan durumlarını karşılastırarak, analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tezin temel 
argumanı şudur ki anayasaların demokratik özellikleri, onların uygulanma süreçlerine 
olduğu kadar, anayasa yapma sürecine, anayasa yapmayı etkileyen faktörlere ve 
anayasanın içeriğine baglıdır.  
Karşılaştırılan iki ülke, demokratikleşme sürecine yeni anayasalar kabul ederek 
basladılar. Bu anayasalar, yeni hükümetlerin yapısını düzelttikleri ve temel hakları 
belirdikleri ölçüde demokratikleşme sürecinin önemli unsurları olmuştur. Bundan 
dolayı, anayasalar bu ülkelerin politik sistemlerine, demokratik rejimin temel 
özelliklerini kazandırdılar. Fakat, yönetici seçkinlerin, hukukun üstünlüğü ilkesini 
benimsememesi demokratikleşme projesinin gerçekleşmesine engel oluyor.  
Böylece, anayasalar her ne kadar demokratikleşme sürecini kolaylaştıran 
kurumsal düzenlemeleri yapsalar da, kendi başına iyi işleyen bır demokrasi kuramazlar. 
Demokratikleşme anayasayı aşan çok yönlü bir projedir.  Hukukun üstünlüğü ilkesinin 
yerleşmesi ve yönetici seckinler tarafından benimsenmesi Dogu Avrupadaki ülkelerdeki 
demokratikleşme sürecini mümkün kılacak en önemli etkendir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Anayasa, Demokratikleşme, Doğu Avrupa, Bulgaristan, Macaristan 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Following the renewed interest in the formal aspects of political science, such as 
rules, procedures and institutions, the impact of constitutional incentives on the life of 
the polity has become a fundamental political question. Simultaneously, the worldwide 
movement toward democratization has inspired a large literature on regime transition 
and consolidation.   These two trends have cross-fertilized, producing a research 
program on the democratization attributes of constitutions. This study intends to 
contribute to its main question: how and to what extent constitutions impact 
democratization? 
The new constitutions adopted in post-communist Europe are a good laboratory 
for studying the impact of constitutions in the democratization process. The new 
constitutions and political transformations occurred in the course of only few years, 
which means that the constitutional input and regime transformations can be observed 
and evaluated directly. This research is an effort to make use of the post-communist 
experience to explain to what degree certain constitution-making processes and 
constitutional choices assist the democratization process. To what extent the new 
constitutions can explain the different records of democratization in different countries 
of the region?  
This study compares the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, which have both 
replaced their old constitutions with new ones at the very beginning of their transitions. 
In addition to certain similarities within the two constitutions’ design, these two 
countries also display a set of differences with regard to the constitution–making factors 
and processes and especially the implementation of their constitutional devices. The aim 
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of this study is to compare the impact of these variables in order to test my hypothesis 
that the democratic attributes of constitutions are contingent to the constitution–making 
factors and processes, constitutional design and its implementation.  
The first chapter is aimed to articulate the theoretical argument that constitutional 
restraints enable democracy. Constitutions impose procedural hurdles for the current 
majority, as well as on the passionate behavior of the demos; they create mechanisms to 
insure that people’s representatives can not easily betray their electorates; and they 
provide the fundamental rules of the polity that enable democracy to function 
effectively.  Constitutional constraints gain even more significance in the conditions of 
a volatile environment with unique chances for abuses, which characterize the process 
of transition to democracy. My findings suggest that constitutional democracy is the 
surest path to democracy.  
However, the assumed relationship between constitutions and democratization is 
not straightforward. The second chapter focuses on constitution–making as an 
intermediate variable, which may foster or inhibit democratization. Both our case 
studies provide evidence that the extrication mode and the Round Table agreements 
were important factors to determine the democratic credentials of the new constitutions. 
With regard to the aspects of the constitution–making process, however, Eastern Europe 
supplies little evidence to conclude with an optimal constitution–making process. A 
dubious  process in Hungary  did not mean that democracy feared better in Bulgaria 
than in Hungary. 
The third chapter intends to consolidate the argument that the correlation 
between constitutions and democracy is complex, by introducing another intermediate 
variable, which seems to effect democratization: constitutions’ effectiveness. I study 
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effectiveness on two levels. First, the design of the constitutional texts, and second, the 
implementation of the constitutional devices in practice. In addition to the text of the 
constitutions, I make use of the survey data collected from the New European 
Barometer during 2001. My findings suggest that, although there are some minor 
problems with the constitutional provisions, they have both imparted their regimes with 
the fundamental characteristics of democratic regimes. The lack of the rule of law in the 
governing process, on the other hand, illustrates the gap existing between constitutional 
principles and their implementation in reality. Thus, constitutional provisions can hardly 
be attributed  a definitive role in engineering democratic systems.    
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CHAPTER I:  
CONSTITUTIONALISM –A NECESSARY SHIELD FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The post-communist transition has often been seen as an evil advocate’s 
summary because of its unprecedented magnitude of transformation, communist legacies 
and a pervasive weakness of law, which can be defined at best as a rule by law, and at 
worst as a degradation of state into clientelist relations. In the midst of a troublesome 
situation, it is very important to raise the question of the fate of democracy, which is the 
underlying motive of transition. Can democracy flourish in the very challenging 
environment of transformation?  How can democracy enter into a certain path of 
development and avoid being subject to the uncertainty of the transition? 
My normative assumption through the chapter is that the instauration and 
eventual consolidation of political democracy constitutes a desirable goal per se. The 
question is not why, but how can democracy win its victory? 
My hypothetical answer is that constitutionalism provides a secure shield for 
democracy to get in, especially during the troubled times of transition. 
Constitutionalism provides well-defined limits to the potential abusers of democracy.   
The efforts to understand transition have usually stressed the peculiarities of the 
region, and have called for an analysis at the crossroads of law and society, culture and 
history, economics and politics, employing a multi-disciplinary and case specific 
methodology to the study of the subject. The analysis vacillates between three levels of 
analysis –post-communist legacies, institutions that emerged in the scene and the  
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strategic decisions of the main actors.  My methodology to study the prospects of 
democracy, in the context of transition, is less ambitious than a country-specific and 
multi-layered analysis. I approach the problem analyzing the interaction among three 
variables: democracy, constitutionalism and transition.  
The first part is an effort to provide an overview of the concepts, untangle and 
establish definitions of each.  I adopt a process oriented analytical approach to the 
concepts. The first step to enter to the heart of the matter, is analyzing the relation 
between constitutionalism and democracy. This part aims to show that both theories 
complete each other.  In the third part, while introducing the complexity of the 
transition process, I argue that constitutional restrains are important to put order to the 
all-fluctuating environment, which creates unique chances for abuses.  
My findings do insert tones of hopes to the gloomy picture of the future of 
democratization in transition. I argue that constitutional democracy is the surest path to 
democracy because it guarantees its protection from both the ability of man to make a 
mess of things and the risk of a total big bang to drag democracy into its black hole.  
 
1.2 Untangling the Concepts 
 
1.2.1 Democratization  
Defining democratization is a thorny task, mainly, but not only because 
democratic theory and polity are undergoing a process of restructuring, which has put 
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into question the very certain lines of liberal democratic orthodoxy1 (Saward, 2001: 
560). However, escaping the debate on today's democratic innovations and future 
sketches, I try to adopt a broad definition of democratization, which stands over the 
disputable arguments, but is still essential and operative2 (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986: 10). This definition must demarcate the substantive core of democratization, 
being basic democratic principles, and the operationalization of those principles, being 
“devices that enact principles” (Saward, 2001: 577). As such, it embodies some 
minimum standards, while conceiving of an open-ended process of democratization.  
Democratic theory is based on the presumption of human dignity educed from 
the very nature of human being. Being worth of respect, man is worth of autonomy and 
self-realization, which in the context of politics stands for sharing the governance of its 
political community. The modern politics has alternated people’s right of self-
government to a more feasible form of delegating their right of self-government to their 
freely elected representatives. Thus, the basic democratic premise has been translated to 
a set of democratic principles: political equality, inclusion, common interest and 
participation (Saward, 2001: 577).  
The formal procedures to operationalise democracy3 ( see Saward, 2001, Nino, 
1993) range between a wide variety of institutional choices, depending from a complex 
set of indigenous factors. However, there is almost consensus on a formal procedural 
minimum, which need obtain: secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular 
                                                 
1 Saward describes the undisputable elements of a traditional approach to democracy as a) representative 
institutions, b) formal structures of the state, c) territorial units, d) majority rule, e) constitutional 
constrains f) formal and hierarchical accountability of elected officials.  
2 While democracy itself is a matter of principles, democratization is seen as a process of  putting these 
principles into practice through specific and detailed rules and procedures.  
3 Saward argues that procedures are necessary to enact substantive democratic principles.  Nino offers a 
similiar argument maintaining that democratic process of decision making is more reliable than informal 
subjective discussion to reach solutions to inter-subjective issues.  
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elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive 
accountability. Together with a plethora of rights those procedures create an open 
market of political ideas that allow people to choose the candidates they find 
appropriate. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter incorporates these principles and procedures in the 
concept of citizenship, which is “both the right to be treated by fellow human beings as 
equal with respect to the making of collective choices and the obligation of those 
implementing such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of 
the polity" (O’ Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 10). However, democratically designed 
mechanisms provide only opportunities for the pursuit of democratization. People must 
earn their liberty by the quality of their decisions. 
 
1.2.2 Constitutionalism 
The democratic norm "one person one vote”, inevitably, generates a simple 
majority rule, which makes decision-making vulnerable to majority's decisions. In the 
words of Tocqueville, the democratic era is an age of quantity, after that of quality. 
Although it is only a decision-making arrangement, ‘unwise’ majorities can forget about 
the rest, hence harming the very essence of democracy that people not majority is the 
sovereign. 
 Constitutionalism stands for limits on majority’s decisions, that are in some 
sense self-imposed, to prevent a possible dictatorship of the majority. Thus,  
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constitutionalism fights a two front-war: against the executive and the legislative 
branches of government. 
 Any government wants to have discretionary and effective powers of action. But, 
the mere possibility it may use its powers for particularistic purposes, and decide that 
rights ought not stand in its way, makes it necessary to put restrains on government, 
even when it claims to act in the name of the common good. Elster sums up the 
constitutionalism’s struggle with day-to-day wielders of power as “rules versus 
discretion”, while constitutionalism’s struggle with those that decide futures rules of the 
game as “reason versus passion” (Elster, 1988b: 6). Thus, constitutionalism is assumed 
to be grounded in reasonable rules, which are fenced off from the discretion and passion 
of the  decision-making majorities.   
Schmitt, a critique, but also one of the foremost specialists of liberal 
constitutionalism, asserts that in line with the liberal philosophy of freedom the 
individual can only be subject to the rule of reason. Through reason, the individual may 
come to justify certain limits to its freedom. Man enters into a contract with other fellow 
man to establish the state, which must regulate and make compatible individuals’ 
freedoms. Individuals have in principle unlimited freedom, whereas state is in principle 
limited to intervene. Limits to freedom are not subject to state’s decision but to reason’s 
determination. Thus, “the guiding principle of the Rechtsstaat is to protect the freedom 
of the individual against the power of the state” (Slagstad, 1988: 104).   
On the other hand, the Rechtsstaat is a legal state, where laws guide the 
governors ‘ruling’ because “Governors rule at the extent they follow the existing 
positive norms in a competent way” (Slagstad, 1988: 106). In addition to being a legal 
state, which subordinates the legitimacy of action to the respect for law, Rechtsstaat is a 
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“doctrine specifying which characteristics rules need to posses in order to be regarded 
as law” (Slagstad, 1988: 107). Although, Schmitt is highly critical to the binding of 
state through the general character of the legal norms embedded in constitutionalism, 
his analysis elicits the substantial core of constitutionalism. But, constitutionalism can 
be attached better attributes if one extends the focus of the political beyond the 
distinction friend and foe proposed by Schmitt (1996: 19–79). 
While Schmitt provides a rigid definition, conceiving of constitutionalism as a 
closed and sovereign system of legal norms and prescriptions that reduce the state to 
nothing but norms or procedures, it seems that constrains to political power through 
certain normative and procedural limitations, are indispensable to the concept and 
operationalisation of constitutionalism.  
Concerned with human inclination to act selfishly and abuse power (see Hobbes, 
1991: 183–201), constitutional theorists advocate institutional restrains on substantive 
matters, on the grounds that rules of reason prevent decision makers to abuse the 
authority delegated to them. It presumes that there are standards to judge whether public 
policies infringe on human dignity and democratic principles. Therefore, the legitimacy 
of the politics depends on substantive criteria as much as it depends on the authenticity 
of the decision makers. But, what are the standards employed to judge the legitimacy of 
politics and how are they embedded in constitutions?  
 
1.2.3 Constitution  
In its general meaning, the constitution makes up or patterns a political system, 
which implies it claims control over all other political acts. Most of the texts labeled 
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constitutions, implicitly or explicitly, proclaim themselves to be the supreme law of the 
land.  
Constitutions are very different from each other, and are embedded in a case 
specific socio-political and historical context, which makes it difficult to generalize and 
come up with one concept of constitution. However, most of the liberal constitutions 
include a common set of rules. Schmitt prescribes the Western type constitution as a 
document, which “corresponds to demands for civil freedom and definite guarantees of 
this freedom” (Slagstad, 1988: 104). The basic features he attaches to constitutions are 
first, a system of guarantees of freedom from state interference, and second, the 
difficulty to alter or amend it comparing with other legislation, inducing an element of 
stability. In the liberal constitutions individual freedoms and guarantees are realized 
through  a) the recognition of basic rights, b) the division and balance of powers and c) 
a minimum of popular participation in the legislative process. The need for stability is 
realized through the prescription of complicated procedures to change the constitution, 
ensuring a degree of permanence (Slagstad, 1988: 104). 
Another view enlarges the scope of Schmitt’s definition of constitution by 
defining its functions as: a) a sketch of the fundamental modes of legitimate 
government operations, escaping proclamation of any substantial values despite 
obedience to itself; b) a guardian of fundamental rights incorporating both democratic 
principles and constitutionalism’s concern to limit the power of representatives; c) a 
symbol and formative force of people’s active consent to remain a nation for better or 
worse, through prosperity and poverty, in peace and war, guiding as well as expressing 
people's hopes for themselves as a nation (Murphy, 1993: 8). The two definitions of 
constitutions, however, share three common features the liberal constitutions must have: 
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provisions of fundamental rights, provisions of modes of legitimate government and 
difficult rules of amendment.  And, they both employ a formalist analysis, which relies 
on the structural features of constitutional documents. 
 On the assumption that in contemporary societies, the legitimacy of the state 
rests upon the government’s adherence to the rule of law, constitutions are judged from 
the extent they encompass rational-legal institutions such as judicial review, due process 
of law and separation of powers. The formalist view presupposes that constitutions 
provide rules for making rules and state organization, which parallels a predilection of 
norms and subordinated institution building. 
Some other scholars approach constitutions as a dynamic process, rooted in the 
local social realities. Although, constitutions have a country-specific dimension and it is 
hard to find even two identical ones, a pure relativist approach leads us nowhere 
because its antipathy towards values creates a problematic basis to see rule of law and 
discretion, reason and passion, individual and majority’s will, anarchy and institutions, 
man and state, and consequently, democracy and dictatorship in the same value free and 
equal terms. The constitution’s analysis should incorporate the relativist element only at 
the extent it pays respect to a set of minimalist procedural and substantial parameters. 
Thus, it is possible to view constitutions as an open and dynamic process, allowing for 
case-specific innovations, but it demarcates the apriori requirements for a constitution to 
pass the exam of democracy.  
The substantive criteria would be the extent constitutions embody the democratic 
principles like individual rights and freedoms, which guarantee that some rights are not 
subject to decision-making procedures, and allow people to influence, check and replace 
their decision-makers, if necessary. The necessary procedures would be legal-rational 
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mechanisms that ensure the functioning of fundamental democratic principles like 
judicial review, the rule of law, and separation of powers.  
  
1.2.4 Transition  
To define transition is as difficult as to comprehend uncertainty. A loose and 
empty definition would be that it is the interval between the changes of two different 
political regimes. We may know the starting point of the transition, which is delimited 
from the launching of the process of dissolution of the existing regime usually put under 
the label authoritarian, but it is certainly difficult to predict its final destination. Thus, it 
is a transformation process from a certain regime, whose rules of the game has been put 
into serious question to an uncertain “something else”. The something else differs from 
the instauration of a democratic system to a return to authoritarianism or simply a 
vicious circle of confusion, lacking an enduring solution to political regime. However, 
transition to democracy implies a peaceful transformation, different from a 
revolutionary approach to change, which has a more or less articulated end point usually 
labeled under very general terms of democratization.  
 The most important defining characteristic of transition is, that the rules of the 
political game, far from being stable and legitimate, are arduously contested, hence in a 
continuous flux. It is a quarrel battle where “actors struggle to satisfy their immediate 
interests, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine 
likely winners and losers in the future” (O’ Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 6). Thus, it is 
a normative movement because it has a claim to democratization, but it is also a 
factional game vulnerable to groups and individuals particularistic interests. 
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In transition, rights and arrangements, which in a stable democracy would be 
reliably embedded in constitution and protected through impersonal-institutional 
provisions, are still de jure or de facto in the hands of former rulers. Therefore, certain 
individuals’ attitudes, preferences, choices and decisions are an important input of the 
political outcome of the transition. Schmitter attaches a decisive role in determining the 
outcomes of the political game to the casual inputs like unexpected events, insufficient 
information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about motives and interests and 
plasticity of political identities (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 5).  
The problem is the extent to which this input causes an aberration of political 
output from the desirable end goal of the transition, articulated at its very beginning, –
instauration of democracy. It is properly here that constitutional democratic theory and 
proper substantial and balanced “rules to make rules”, embedded in formal and 
authoritative constitutions, introduce an element of controlling the worst enemy, still 
necessary component of democracy –unpredictability.  
Although proper formal substantial limits to the misuse of political power may 
not, ideally, safeguard democracy, introduce legitimacy or pattern democratic attitudes; 
they smooth the path towards democracy. Liberal democratic constitutions reduce the 
uncertainty that the “something else” will be very different from democracy because at 
the least they remind people that their government is what they ‘deserve’, but not what 
they aspire for.  They show the light at the end of the tunnel, hence the way out of 
transition and abnormality.  
The transition is over when the conflict on the very rules of the political game 
ceases to be the feature of politics. The parties go out of abnormality when they settle 
on and obey rules defining legitimate channels to political power, means to exercise 
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power and the criteria to resolve the conflict with the others. The democracy conquests 
its victory when a “normal” uncertainty, set up in constitutional rules gets settled. The 
normal uncertainty is an institutionalized uncertainty. Its essential feature is that “none 
can be certain that their interests will triumph. All forces must struggle repeatedly for 
the realization of their interests since no one is protected by the virtue of its position” 
(Przworski, 1988: 62).  In the same line of argument, Nino maintains that normal 
uncertainty is the existence of inter-subjective legal rules reached through a deliberative 
debate in which people participate equally (Nino, 1993).   
 
1.3 Constitutional Democracy 
-Preventing Human Beings to Make a Mess of Things 
 
1.3.1 Constitution and Democracy are Mutually Supportive 
To understand the relation between democracy and constitutionalism and the 
effect of their merging we should start from their commonality: they are both based on 
the notion of human worth and dignity and concerned with mitigating the risks of being 
a member of political society to these values.  Still, they differ significantly from the 
approach each has to human nature and the means they propose to protect human 
dignity. Democracy tends to promote participation and protect the right of individual to 
share the governing of their community. It assumes that people have or can develop the 
required skills to engage in responsible deliberation and decision-making. 
Constitutionalism, on the other hand, has a more pessimistic view of selfish and power 
abusing humans and seeks to defend democratic values through institutional restraints 
on substantive matters.  
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 Seen independently, both theories carry the danger of destroying the very aim 
they stand for. The majority rule, representatives or even the pluralist groups associated 
with democracy, may restrict the ‘others’ rights at the extent it negates their right and 
quality of participation4 (for a discussion on an non–unitary concept of democracy see 
Sunstain, 1988: 352). It may turn politics into a self-interested representation, factional 
tyranny and/or permanent revolution.  Constitutionalism perils lie in generating 
governmental inaction, hence imposing governance costs. Caught in between 
prearranged rules, often descending to previous generations, governments may not be 
able to implement their programs given the obstacles that constitutional laws pose on 
their activity.  The solution to both democracy and constitutionalism, containing the 
grains of their own destruction, is their merging together in order to keep an eye to each 
other’s risks. Historical experience validates the claim that “to enjoy reasonably 
effective but still limited government, many countries have adopted a mix of 
constitutionalism and democratic theory” (Murphy, 1993: 6). 
The output of their merging, constitutional democracy encompasses the 
democratic precondition of popular participation and simultaneously limits people’s 
government by a variety of substantial and institutional means. Constitutional 
democracy’s goal of securing a realm for public discussion and collective selection of 
preferences (Sustain, 1988: 352) serves to continuation of democratic rule. Holmes, one 
of its prominent defenders, furthers the traditional justification for constitutional 
                                                 
4 Many scholars of democracy argue that pathologies of democracy and their solution depend from 
whether you see democracy in pluralist or republican terms. In a pluralist democracy different groups 
struggle for sources and make it vulnerable to self-interested and factional tyranny. Republican democracy 
and its main focus on freedom, hence participation of the active citizens to decide the terms of their 
political life enhances irregularity and almost a permanent revolution in politics. However, in this paper 
democracy is seen an independent variable. It is defined as a procedure to establish validity of impersonal 
preferences.  
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democracy, as invoking fundamental rights and dis-empowering myopic majorities, by 
claiming that certain restrains enable democracy (Holmes, 1988: 233). 
Moreover, as put in his words, constitutional democracy is the most humane 
political system because “[It] keeps open the widest gamut of alternatives for new and 
better decisions. [] Our humanity is best located in our ability not merely to decide but 
also to undo unsatisfactory past decisions and decide again” (Holmes, 1988: 233). But, 
how does constitutional democracy work and what are its attributes? 
 
1.3.2 Subordinating Politics to the Rule of Law  
Constitutional democracy is a regime, which provides a certain conceptual and 
institutional web between constitutionalism, democracy and politics. The crucial point 
of this web is the general norm that law not governors rule. Translated in a more 
concrete language, constitutions provide a variety of laws, which command and 
organize people’s government while protecting and promoting people’s rights.  
Constitutional democracy’s underlying assumption is that no man or group of 
man is good enough to rule without the consent of his or her subjects.  The constitution 
is to ensure that no man can have a last word in ruling. Therefore, it introduces 
impersonal laws that serve as positive criteria to measure legitimacy and embeds 
procedures that validate their legitimacy. The constitution freezes those criteria by 
fencing them off from majority because they are too important to be subject to 
vulnerabilities of majority politics.  These attachments add to the simple democratic 
principle of participation in order to correct the deficiencies of its output –
representation. Argentina’s first civilian president, Alfonsin, advocates the necessity of 
constitutional constrains arguing, “The term democracy conotates more than simply 
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participatory and representative government. It encompasses a rule of law bound by the 
central requisites of liberalism –a set of traditional civil and political rights that serve to 
deter state action” (1993: 41) 
  Laws embedded in constitutions vary according to the constitutional strategies 
pursued to reinforce democratic processes. These strategies are usually categorized in 
two: a) structural provisions and b) rights provisions (Slagstad, 1988). Structural 
provisions, or in Schmitt’s terms organizational principles, are generally speaking 
institutional devices, which reinforce democratic processes. One of the typical structural 
measures consists in the separation of powers and a system of devices to check and 
balance government’s powers with the intention to enhance popular control to 
government’s acts. Thus, state is divided into legislative, executive and judicial 
branches, arranged within a system, which designates areas of competence for each 
branch. Although insulated from majoritarian politics, to the extent they are embedded 
in hardly amendable constitutional texts, structural provisions should be seen as 
democratic insofar as they ensure that government will act in the interest of the public.  
Ackerman advocates the controlling and virtue economizing functions of the 
separation of powers on the grounds that “it gives elected officials the powerful 
incentives to question the success with which rival representatives have embodied the 
political will of we the people” (Ackerman, 1988). Holmes furthers Ackerman’s thesis 
arguing that the imposed equilibrium among different branches of government makes it 
more sensitive to fluctuations in public opinion (Holmes, 1988: 230). He attaches to the 
separation of powers a strong democracy sustaining role considering its divide and rule 
maxim as “a strategy by which the governed might enforce their will upon their would 
be governors” (Holmes, 1988: 229). Thus, the separation of powers seem to create the 
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conditions for popular government. In the same line of argument, Schmitt argues that 
the organizational principle provides for mutual control and binding of the state 
apparatus, which does actually serve the other principle he assigns to the liberal 
constitutions –distributive one (Slagstad, 1988: 105).  
According to Schmitt, the distributive principle designates the scope of 
individual freedom (Slagstad, 1988: 104). Because of their pre- or meta-political nature, 
human rights override the necessity of consent and are excluded from being subject of 
debate, redefinition and state intervention. In this respect, liberal constitutions serve two 
functions: they protect individual rights and form an obstacle to certain changes, which 
could have been carried out if the majority would have had its way. Although there is 
not a general consensus on the list of fundamental rights, they necessarily include rights 
that belong to individuals by virtue of being human and political rights that should 
defend man located in his respective political community.  
Dividing the set of human into civil and political, constitutions regulate a 
division between the private and public spheres. The private holds the topics removed 
from the public scrutiny. Holmes maintains that constitutional insulation of certain 
rights insures a well functioning of the democratic process (Holmes, 1988).  
 
1.3.3 Attributes of Constitutional Democracy 
To turn back to our initial point of this section, constitutional democracy is a 
political regime self-bound with the rule of law, which organizes and sets limits to the 
activity of the state, and guarantees fundamental human rights. The web of constitution, 
democratic procedures and political activity operates under the umbrella of an 
unquestioned, impersonal, normative and rational law, which provides legitimacy by 
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virtue of being the product of human deliberation. Thus, the political activity is under 
the constrains of substantial and institutional standards designed to protect, complement 
and enhance democracy.  
Consequently, in a constitutional democratic regime, the political process is 
almost by definition, directed towards democracy. Democracy is not let to forces of 
chance, reflection or choice. It is ensured through unquestioned determinant rules. In 
addition to the ambitious claim to democracy, constitutional democracy induces a set of 
political trends, whose not exhaustive list would be stability, discretion, continuity, 
normality, possibility of redefinition of the rules, and virtue economizing. However this 
is only an ideal model. It remains to be seen how it works in the very complex, 
challenging and fluctuating reality of the post-communist transition.  
 
1.4 Democracy is too Important to be Left to Chance 
 
1.4.1 Big Bang 
The post-communist transition can be seen as the closest thing we have ever had 
to a big bang. It aimed at creating everything anew   -elites, institutions, markets, rules, 
states, nations and even identities. Each of them is a peace of the story of success and/or 
failure. Together with the general feeling that the transition is not a success story, 
comparing with the great expectations at the beginning of the epoch, there is the 
prevailing estimation that by and large, Eastern Europeans have thrown down the walls, 
but have not built the bridges. And, it seems to be more difficult to construct than to 
demolish.  
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Countries in transition will still have to face problems of an unprecedented 
magnitude –they must build a new political system based on democracy, replace the 
communist order, create a new free market economy, come to grips with the transition 
logic and condense all these transformations, that took centuries in other parts of the 
world, in the course of few years. Thus, there is a variety of concerns remarking the 
post-communist transition in Eastern Europe: a) the challenge of simultaneous 
economic, political and social transformations; b) institutional vacuum that allows for 
abuses; and c) transition logic. The interaction of these main issues that constitute the 
context   of Eastern Europe establish a unique environment, and certainly not the ideal 
one, for the development of democracy in the region. However, while dealing with a set 
of sometimes contradictory issues and resolving transition’s dilemmas in a yet unsettled 
political milieu, the transition must guarantee a safe future to democracy.  
 
1.4.1.1 Simultaneous Economic, Political and Social Transformations 
Although transition in Eastern Europe is not a uniform process, with regard to its 
initial point, institutional design and outcome of the whole process, there is a broad 
consensus on the basic ingredients that has to go into any such system: constitutional 
democracy, competitive markets and a welfare state. These ingredients are believed to 
be correlated with the very motive of the transition, which in Elster’s words is “an 
economic and political regime that will guarantee individual rights, ensure popular 
participation in decision making and generate equitable economic growth” (Elster, 
1993: 267–275). Other observers of Eastern Europe add another reform ingredient, 
which is important taking into account the 40 years experience leaving without freedom 
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–changing attitudes of the elites and general public at large (Sayo and Losonci, 1993: 
321–339). 
On the pessimistic side, there are not few those arguing that, the price and 
ownership reform required to create a market system and constitutional guarantees for 
individual rights are an impossibility theorem. The hardships associating a total 
reformation of the economic system like increasing unemployment and bankruptcies 
will prove too hard to endure. Politically empowered masses may use their political 
rights to reverse the process. Democratic systems that do not deliver economic benefits 
are likely to be unstable in the long run (Elster, 1993: 267–275). 
As a matter of fact, the transition process has taken dramatic colors in many 
aspects. It has hardly satisfied people’s economic expectations with the majority of 
them believing they were better of during communist regime. The number of confused 
people convinced that their economic problems started in 1989 seem to be quite large 
(Evidence?). It has even enhanced nostalgia for the communist past none is proud of 
(Rose, 2001). Plagued by ramshackle infrastructure, illegal traffics of arms, drugs and 
prostitution, the transition economies are the scene of contradictory developments, 
which cannot always be associated with progress. Although the argument, that they may 
undermine each other is one of the ongoing questions of transition, successful transition 
cases among Eastern Europe countries have proved that economic reform can be 
reconciled with the democratic transformations. 
  Another troubling   question of post-communist transition is the political culture 
accumulated through the communist regime. Law is attached a communist connotation, 
according to which law is bureaucratic, purposive and instrumental to state interest 
rather than people rights (Sayo and Losonci, 1993: 321–339). Popular and elite’s 
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attitudes and beliefs do provide a serious obstacle to the flourishing of democracy and 
provide a serious challenge even when perfect rules are at place. 
  Consequently, some authors advocate the argument that “one can not take it for 
granted that people are unanimously for democracy” (Elster, 1993: 271). The post-
communist political culture in Eastern Europe can emasculate democracy, but it does 
not infer that people ‘may not be for democracy’. Popular stance towards democratic 
rules and procedures should not be explained by the lack of desire for democracy but as 
a lack of experience with its rules and bitter experience with abuses under the name of 
democracy. On the other hand, the unpleasant and difficult transition has only added to 
the accumulated skepticism towards the new system.  
 
1.4.1.2 Institutional Vacuum, which Allows for Abuses 
The post-communist big bang has wiped out most of the social economic and 
political institutions, built up for decades. While the collapse of communism was fast 
and almost total, the recreation was slow and partial. Therefore, what we are left with is 
a social and institutional vacuum.  
 The social vacuum, expressed in the reluctant social reorganization, is partly a 
consequence of the widespread anomie of the post-socialist society.  Being subject to an 
extraordinary fast change, people have hardly been able to adopt and have responded 
with what Bobinska refers to as “passive consent to the change” (1993: 305). She also 
argues that in most of the cases, if there was any reaction at all, it took the form of 
defending the interests threatened by the change. 
In addition to the anomie produced by transformation itself, Eastern European 
society lacked the dynamism of a civic society, which until some years ago was seen as 
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the enemy of the people. One of the paradoxes of the transition is that a regime, which 
stands on the dynamics of grassroots initiatives and self-organization was introduced 
from above. The passivity of society and a well-rooted strong state did frame a 
perception of state as the main agent of change, as the rule maker, as the addressee of 
various expectations and as the source of conflicts (Bobinska, 1993: 305). The 
powerless society seems to have allowed for the development of a special bureaucratic-
legal form of the state, which Sayo refers to as rule by law5 (Sayo and Losonci, 1993: 
321–339). 
Although Eastern Europeans have since the beginning of transformation opted 
for the development of the rule of law system, seen as a mean to protect society and 
human rights from an all pervasive state domination, most of the studies on the post-
communist transition stress the wide gaps that exist between law and reality in the 
region. The prevailing argument is that these societies lack behind in developing a rule 
of law either because they failed in replacing their previous laws with proper ones or 
because the existing laws are poorly obeyed to. Both arguments pinpoint to two 
troublesome questions of transition: a) lack of state restricting laws and b) misuse of 
laws. The main source of both problems is the existence of a political elite, whose 
behaviors can hardly fit within the norms of a democratic system.  
Mostly emerging from the round table negotiations, where communist elites were 
the main party negotiating the terms of the new regime, the post-communist systems are 
packed with dinosaurs of politics and/or embedded in compromises within interest-
driven elites, which has put into question the new institutional arrangements. The 
                                                 
5   The rule by law underlines a special role for state in society.  This form of law is attractive to all social 
and political forces that have an interest in maintaining some kind of etatist system mainly for the sake of 
their private interests.   
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negotiation with communist has served to question the impartiality, hence legitimacy of 
the post-communist laws. Feeling the danger of change, the elites made it sure to secure 
a privileged post in running the country and taking the biggest part of the public cake. 
Laws carrying their signatures do also bear their concerns. Laws that are questioned 
their impartiality and normative attachment is below the benchmark of being immune 
from becoming themselves the object of conflict.  
The other problem with the rule of law is it has long been a facade rather than 
what Schmitt refers to as command. Many observers of transition process maintain that 
laws in Eastern Europe are written according to European standards and are applied 
according to Eastern standards. Legislation is one thing and the reality is another thing. 
The Eastern Europe political elite does escape laws in different forms, but today’s main 
departure from the rule of law is corruption. Rose, for example, argues that in the post-
communist states, the currency of privilege is money, and privatization has created great 
opportunities to reap profits (Rose, 2001: 101). Corruption and crime no longer exists in 
isolation with the state, if it ever did. Today’s stakes are too big to be left to criminals. 
Thus, state has degraded in a network of interests and its institutions have degraded in a 
network of political clienteles (Rose, 2001: 103).  
To conclude the panorama of transition, it is justifiable to say that the most 
political rights granted to people make no sense while those inside the government use 
elected office to pursue their interests. Therefore governors should be limited within 
precise borders and should be subjected to strict procedures, which enforce those 
borders. However, constitutional settlements can facilitate but,  they do not resolve 
problems with the poor implementation of laws.  
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1.4.1.3 The Logic of Transition  
The post-communist transition is a process whose characteristic features like   
institutional and social vacuum, abuses with law, knotty economic, political and social 
transformations, and the peculiarities of transition itself interact with each other. Its 
picture can be fully captured by considering all its bits and pieces. The logic of 
transition somehow completes a snapshot of the whole.  
In the conceptual level, transition is characterized by uncertainty, arduously 
contested rules and a departure to something else. The post-communist transition 
includes all those elements with the difference that the “something else” is a defined 
goal –democracy. Thus, it can be conceptualized as a movement   along the axis where 
democracy is one of the poles. However, being the arena of contested rules and other 
variables that do not always fit to democracy, transition can be anything but a linear 
process. As Bobinska puts it, transition is a period “with a dynamic of its own, which 
evokes tendencies contradictory to the logic of the democracy” (1993: 300). In line with 
her idea that transition should not be seen as instrumental to democracy but a period 
with its own dynamics, she advocates an important role of the state, which makes it 
possible to fill the gaps of unpredictable market, slow parliament and social vacuum. 
According to Bobinska, however, the measures undertaken to facilitate transition to 
democracy are justifiable as long as they guarantee a safe future to the later. Transition, 
in the long run, is instrumental to democracy. In the case there is a dilemma between 
empowering the state in order to deal with transition and bound the state in order to 
safeguard any aberration from the end goal, given the very reason of transition, the 
latter has priority. 
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1.4.2 The Constitutional Moment 
To turn back to the main issue of this chapter, I now consider the prospects of    
constitutional democracy in the context of the post-communist transition. Does 
constitutional democracy work and how does it work in the very uncertain environment 
of transition?  
An overview of the main challenges of transition left us with the bitter feeling of 
the unpredictability of the coming “something else”. The variety of transition 
components, which often get in the way of democratization, pose an important issue –
does the transition process triumph in establishing a democratic regime? The answer 
seems to be case specific and dependent to the ingredients of each specific transition 
process. However, a part of the answer is that there are small probabilities that 
democratization triumphs over its competitors if it is not taken under the protection of 
fundamental law. 
Democracy, one of the main reasons why Eastern Europeans opted for change 
and  embarked in the process of transition, the dream of whole generations lacking most 
of the fundamental freedoms and subject to arbitrary ideological rules under the 
communist regime is important to be left to chance whatever form it takes: state, elites, 
masses, economic or political transformation, political culture or/and unpredictability. 
Democracy should be taken under control of rules, which cannot be reached by abusers 
and  which take it under control. Constitutional restrains restraints can contribute to 
replacing the unpredictability of transition with reason, rule and legitimacy. 
Constitutionalism places the future of democracy in an almost certain path. 
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Moreover, transition provides a good opportunity for constitutional democracy to 
flourish and settle down, because it constitutes one of the rare moments of what  
Ackerman defines as “the constitutional politics” (1988: 162). This term stands for the 
highest form of political expression, because it provides access to the people 
themselves.  It is a moment of direct popular sovereignty because people express their 
will in the spirit of republican tradition. And, transition provided the moment people of 
Eastern Europe could express their democratic aspirations. As a moment that embodies 
the revolutionary achievement, the constitutional politics is a way the democratic spirit 
of 1989 become a more permanent part of the political order in the region (Ackerman, 
1992).  
However, According to Ackerman, the principles decided upon during the 
extraordinary moment of constitutional politics should constitute the unquestioned rules 
of the normal politics (1988: 163). They should provide the bases for business as usual. 
Constitutions  provide incentives for stability because among others, they prevent 
people to change their mind on important issues and create durable institutions.   
On the other hand, Institutional arrangements create their own foundations within 
society and alter habits, routines and expectations of citizens who come to rely upon 
them.  Observers credit constitutions with developing a public sense of 
constitutionalism and spread the idea and practice of the rechtsstaat. They can create the 
‘spirit of constitutionalism’, which consists in considering basic political institutions as 
stable frames of politics rather than manipulatable tools.  
Rigorous amendment procedures, a system of check and balances among 
branches of government and strict rights provisions, do constrain state’s ability to act. 
They assist in keeping a watch over politics and limiting the political space to 
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maneuver. However, although formal democratic rules embedded in constitutions  are 
important in terms of democratization, rule of law needs to be fully established if 
ordinary people are to reap the full benefits of democratization.    
    
1.5 Conclusions 
My question is concerned with the correlation between constitutionalism, 
democracy and transition -how does constitutionalism effect democracy in the context 
of transition? It takes for granted that democracy is desirable. To quote Tocqueville, 
once the mankind has eaten the fruit of equality there is no way back. Hence, transition 
should be seen as a movement in the axis whose one pole is democracy.  
The basic conclusion of this chapter is that, because democracy is too big a stake 
to be left to the mercy of  transition’s uncertainty, it should be taken under an 
impersonal, rational, legal, legitimate and unquestioned protection. Constitutional 
democracy is the surest path to democracy because it guarantees protection from both 
the ability of man to make a mess of things and the risk of a total big bang to drag 
democracy into its black hole. Moreover, the post-communist transition provides one of 
the rare constitutional moments to settle down democratic rules and an opportunity that  
the democratic spirit of the post-communist change becomes  a permanent feature of 
Eastern Europe. 
The constitutional democratic choice vacillates between two important factors: 
exogenous and indigenous ones. Lacking time to experiment with a third way, the post-
communist designers surveyed successful democratic systems and the liberal 
constitutional tradition, which provided the “can not help it” factor. The indigenous 
component of the choice is a justifiable fear from concentrated power and human rights 
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abuses. Constitutional designers should be discreet to limit political authority by 
maintaining a division of power among government institutions and protect civil rights 
and liberties.  
These conclusions are not to say that constitutions have a deterministic role in 
democratization. The political social and economic environment of transition seems to 
be an obstacle. Constitutions, however, assist democratization to the extent they 
encompass the best of the liberal constitution tradition, mainly the separation and 
balance of powers and a bill of rights, while providing mechanisms for the realization of 
those provisions in reality. The following chapters are intended to test the extent to 
which constitutions impact democratization in the post-communist environment, using 
the cases of Hungary and Bulgaria.     
While constitutional provisions are one of the features of its democratic 
attributes, the legitimacy, hence the democratic elements of the constitution-making 
process seem to be as important as the output itself. The next chapter tends to explore 
the extent to which the constitution-making process makes a difference in terms of 
democratization and test it in our two empirical cases.  
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CHAPTER II:. 
THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTION–MAKING ON 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As it is argued in the first chapter, many students of democracy advocate 
constitutional restraints mainly based on three major arguments. First, favoring a 
deliberative type of democracy as opposed to a voluntaristic one (Holmes, 1995: 300), 
they argue that constitutions impose procedural hurdles on a tiny majority of the day as 
well as on the passionate behavior of the demos by forcing them to engage in a complex 
deliberative system. Second, through the principle of distribution and balance of power 
among the branches of government constitutions create  the mechanism, which ensures 
that people’s representative can not easily betray their electorates. Finally, constitutions 
are attributed the status of  fundamental rules of the political game, that enables 
democracy to function effectively. Thus, constitutional restraints allow the political 
entity to organize in a deliberative, predictable and effective manner, hence enabling 
democracy.   
However, the assumed relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is 
not that straight and forward. Whole generations of political scientist have struggled 
with the dilemma that constitutions impose a corset on the citizens and their 
representatives by taking away some power from them and putting it into the hands of 
constitutional framers.  One of the main questions, such a dilemma inserts, is whether 
constitutions designed by a handful of people can serve to both the framers and the 
people at the same time. The problem associating the very genesis of the constitution is 
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how and at what extent it embodies the interest of the framers and what are their 
implications for the future of democracy?   
In this context, many researchers have addressed the question of the optimal 
constitution-making process, which can help legitimize the output of constitution 
making   that is the final constitutional document. This chapter is an effort to make use 
of the post- communist experience with constitution making to answer to the question 
of whether some kinds of processes can attributed more democratic credentials. In other 
words, what aspects of constitution making and at what extent do they generate 
democratic results? 
My hypothesis is that the constitution-making process is relevant, but they can 
not be attributed definite democratic credentials. My findings suggest that the post-
communist experience does not provide enough evidence to construct an optimal 
constitution-making process.  
This paper is structured in five parts. In the first part, I look at the political choice 
of designing constitutions within a neo-institutionalist analysis, which links rational 
choice and institutionalist approaches. Neo-institutionalist arguments infer three 
important conclusions, which correspond to three main factors influencing constitution 
making: first, political institutions restrict the realm of action of the political actors; 
second, rules are made by actors on whom the formal power to decide has been 
purveyed;  third, post-communist context provides certain opportunities for actions. In 
the second part, I consider constitution-making frameworks, depicting the factors and 
aspects, which can be relevant for democratization.  The literature review on the topic is 
intended to complete Elster’s framework of Constitution-making. Among the variables 
influencing democratic attributes of the constitution-making process, I study the timing 
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of constitution making, the body, which drafts the constitution and the way the 
constitution is adopted.   
Testing the impact of constitution-making process in the cases of Hungary and 
Bulgaria suggests that in spite of the doubtful legitimacy of the constitution-making 
process in the former, democracy does not fare better in the later. Therefore, 
constitution-making process has limited explanation power in terms of democratization. 
However, adopting a constitutional-settlement, be it interim as in the case of Hungary or 
permanent as in the case of Bulgaria, proved to be an indispensable dimension of 
democratization, to the extent it provided more or less democratic rules of the political 
game. 
 
2.2 The Political Choice of Designing Constitutions  
Constitutions and constitution making have until recently been studied within the 
framework of the constitutional law and legislative processes. On the assumption that 
constitutions are legal texts, they were seen as the concern of lawyers. Following the 
renewed interest of political scientist in institutions, however, constitutions have 
increasingly become subject to political science’s inquiry. In this context, constitutions 
have first and foremost come to be seen as “the hour of the politicians.” Constitution 
making, thus, has come to be seen as a political activity where political choices of a 
given system like access to and distribution of power and authority, rules of 
representation, sources of legitimacy, and forms of liberty and equality are made. As 
Zielonka puts it “constitution-making is perhaps the quintessential political act, by 
which countries make choices concerning the most fundamental concepts in political 
life” (Elgie and Zielonska, 2001: 25)  
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 Seen as a political choice, constitution-making is subject to a theoretical debate 
among rational choice and institutionalist approaches, which offer quite different 
explanations to the question of the political process. Are political decisions more 
adequately understood in terms of intentional action guided by individual preferences as 
assumed by rational choice theories, or are they an outflow of institutional structures 
and procedures? According to rational choice theory, decision-making can be explained 
in terms of rational action and self-interest of the individual agent (Heritier, 1996: 26). 
However, the assumption that constitutional choices are thoroughly driven by political 
leaders’ individual interest is vulnerable to two critiques. First, the individual actors 
decide under a “veil of uncertainty” about the consequences of their decisions. Second, 
they hardly know with certainty what their preferences are.   Institutionalists like 
Krasner, on the other hand, conceive of institutions as “building blocs of politics, 
[which] influence available options for policy- making and institutional change. They 
also influence the choices made among available options” (Krasner, 1983).  
Assuming that “political sciences can only lose if one approach is used 
exclusively” (Heritier, 1996: 29),  neo-institutionalists  approaches seek to link these 
two analytical perspectives, thus providing  a complex analytical framework, in which  
decisions of rational self-interested actors matter at the extent they are constrained and 
constituted by the institutional structures.  
In an effort to relate institutional structures and the single rational agent, Heritier 
distinguishes among three links. The first link, she proposes, is Jon Elster’s two-filter 
model. It asserts that the “individual agent chooses among a ‘feasible set’ of 
alternatives” (Elster, 1979: 113). The first filtering processes are structural constrains 
such as the institutional arrangements, rules and value systems of a society. Thus, the 
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constitution makers’ choice is the second filtering process because they can only chose 
among a set of options available given the institutional and rule constrictions.   
The second link between rational choice and institutionalist explanations is to be 
found in the fact that institutions originate in people’s choices (Heritier, 1996: 36). The 
thrust of argument is that constitutional choices embody the interests of their creators, 
however, institutions turn out to constitute constrains on their creators. As Giddens 
points out “institutions expand, so widely in space and in time, that they escape the 
control of every individual actor” (Giddens, 1988: 78)    
The third link in Heritier’s analysis is the capacity of institutions to unfold 
opportunities for action in addition to restraining the alternatives of action. Institutional 
structures are believed to convey general rules of action, but they leave enough room for 
self-interested and strategic action, hence providing both restrictions and opportunities. 
This infers that it makes a big difference who the political actors are and what sources 
they have to obtain advantages in filling out the rules. On the other hand, the capacity of 
actors to influence institutions, thus the design of institutions, seems to be contingent to 
the political context where the interaction occurs (Heritier, 1996: 37).  
The three links we have already outlined provide us with the analytical 
framework to study the factors influencing the constitution making process. First, the 
institutions already in place at the incipient moment of constitution making provide the 
available set of choices for the constitution-makers. The institutional structures, which 
were in place during the constitution-making process were the communist constitutions 
and the negotiated agreements of Round Table Talks6 (RTT). The outdated communist 
                                                 
6 The national roundtable as an institution, as a legitimization device came to Eastern Europe from Spain, 
but it gained a greater significance in the former, where it also worked as  a legitimization device. The 
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constitutions had little credibility and almost no relevance in the post-communist 
political condition because they were seen as hurdle-legacies to be overcome in the 
transition process. RTT negotiations, on the other hand, were the main institutional 
arrangements at the beginning of the transition as they made the macro-choices on 
fundamental regime characteristics and supplied the initial rules of the political game. 
Choices in favor of peaceful transition to democracy, free elections and other 
democratic provisions were already made during the RTT (Agh, 1998: 85). Thus, the 
round-table negotiations were important structural factors to determine later 
constitutional choices.  
A second factor, which seems to impact the constitutional design, are the 
political actors and their capacity to dominate the negotiating process as well as to 
choose the provisions that advance their self-interest.  Taking into account that the 
moment of regime transition is characterized by a set of volatile rules, where the old 
institutions are highly contested and the new ones have yet to be habituated to, there is a 
golden opportunity for political actors to push for self-interested choices.  At the very 
end, constitutions are designed by a group of people and embody their choices. The 
question is not if, but to what extent, constitutional choices embody their creators’ 
interests? 
Third, the context in which RTT took place and the political authors made their 
decisions provides opportunities and/or restrictions. Thus, we have determined three 
major variables that determine constitutional choices –the round tables, the political 
actors involved in the process and the post-communist context. However, they are 
                                                                                                                                                
ruling parties of the former system were not legitimate for the populations any longer, but the new 
opposition forces as yet did not have democratic legitimacy before the elections. To cut this knot, these 
chief actors accepted each other as legitimate partners with whom to talk. (Agh, 1998:  85) 
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themselves subject to a set of processes, which will be the subject of the fourth part of 
the chapter.   
In addition to analyzing the factors that influence constitution-making, in the 
framework of the political choice perspectives, this chapter is conceptualized based on 
Schmitter’s conceptualization of constitution-making as a process and an output (Elgie 
and Zielonska, 2001: 24).  The process is the means by which the constitution is drafted 
and adopted and the product is the constitution itself. The process affects the final 
output and also provides the immediate conditions in which the output then operates. 
The process of constitution making will be the main focus of this chapter.   
                                                                                                                                                           
2.3  Constitution – making: Factors and Processes 
Constitution making has until lately been studied in particular constitution-
making episodes within the framework of ordinary legislative processes. Elster 
identifies the lack of proper studies on how constitutions are made, by asserting that 
“there is not a single book or even article that considers the process of constitution-
making as a distinctive object of positive analysis” (Elster, 1997: 123). 
Consequently, he seeks to categorize the various modes of constitution making 
and focuses on framers' motivations in understanding the constitutional document they 
produce. With regard to the modes of constitution –making he distinguishes among 
several categories: internally imposed constitutions, whose main characteristic is being 
imposed by a sovereign lawmaker without any consideration of the will of the political 
elite; externally imposed constitutions, which are drafted and imposed on the political 
community by a foreign power; constitution-making under imposed constraints, which  
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permits the framers some choices within imposed constraints effecting procedure or/and 
substance; constitution-making in the form of contract between the ruler and social or 
political elite; minority constitution-making, which implies that constitutional framers 
represent a segment of the community; constitution-making by elite accommodation, 
which consists in an agreement among the elites, but lacks popular consultation; and 
constitution-making by directly or indirectly elected assemblies (Elster, 1997: 132).  
Most of Elster’s categories are differentiated in terms of the actors involved in the 
constitution–making process. He develops his approach to constitution making based on 
framers’ motivations, which are defined within the trichotomy of reason, interest and 
passion (Elster, 1997: 135). In addition, he distinguishes between three kinds of framers' 
interest: those of the framers themselves, of their constituencies and of the institutions 
they belong to. However, while considering the impact of reason versus interest, Elster 
advocates Buchanan’s argument that people are swayed by impartial arguments, when 
uncertainty about the future induces them to put themselves ‘in everybody’s place’ 
(Elster, 1997: 131). Thus, Elster’s framework emphasizes the role that actors’ 
motivations play in constitution making, but it also draws references to the institutional 
dimension of constitutional choices and establishes linkages with the context.  
Elster also seeks to build a normative theory of constitution–making by 
designing an optimal structure for constituent assemblies.  The most important features 
he attributes to the optimal constitutional making is that constitutions be written by 
specially convened and broadly representative assemblies, be dictated by political rather 
than technical considerations and be designed within time limits (Elster, 1997: 138). 
The normative model he inserts seem to be based upon the body who drafts the 
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constitution, its representativeness and the time frame of designing the document, but 
those aspects of constitution-making he refers to are not clearly distinguished.   
 
2.3.1 The Factors Shaping Constitution-making 
The analysis of the factors effecting the constitution-making process in CEE is 
furthered in the empirical studies of Elster, Offe and Preuss, who concentrate on actors’ 
input in the process; Agh, who emphasizes the institutional constrains on the actors 
choices; and Stephan and Linz, who contribute to the literature by studying the impact 
of the past to the paths of transition.  
Elster, Offe and Preuss establish connections between the past and the future, 
related in their concept of the extrication mode, which according to them seems to effect 
the agency of transition, hence constitution-makers also (1998: 63-156). Agh, looks at 
the extrication period through the lens of transitory institutions, mainly RTT, which 
serve to link but also separate the past from the future (1998). For Linz and Stephan, 
however, the past, mainly the previous regime type, constitutes an independent variable 
determining the availability of different paths to transition (1996: 3-83). Let us, now 
look at how the past, actors and institutions influence the recent wave of constitution 
making in CEE.  
In their comparative study of institutional design in post-communist societies, 
Elster, Offe and Preuss seek to give an account of the political procedures, forces and 
issues, which shaped the recent wave of constitution making in the region. Analyzing 
the making of the new constitutions the authors draw strong reference to the actors, who 
dominated the process, which they sum up as both arguing and bargaining. Arguing 
stands for the framers attempt to offer impartial arguments by referring to common 
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interest, public good, individual rights and democratic values. Bargaining, on the other 
hand, refers to framers' efforts to utilize threat-based arguments in order to get their way 
(Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 77)  
Their empirical study of Eastern Europe enlarges the scope of  Elster’s  
framework  of constitution-making process by adding the variable of modes of 
extrication7 (1998: 48), which influences the constitutional choice. The correlation 
between forms of extrication and constitutional choices is established based on the 
assumption that the overthrow of an existing regime by a violent revolution tends to 
produce unstable democratic systems and, on the other hand, Bauman’s conceptual 
distinction between systemic and political revolutions. While political revolutions adjust 
a political regime and are lunched by actors that represent collective ‘transformative’ 
interests, the agents of systemic revolutions dismantle the whole regime finding 
themselves in  a situation when society and its actors have still to be (re)constructed 
(Bauman, 1993). Thus, the authors maintain that the peaceful, transformative and 
systemic elements of the mode of extrication determined the actors who controlled the 
course of the events and left lasting institutional traces on the new policy” (Elster, Offe 
and Preuss, 1998: 53) 
An important institution of the extrication process, which most of the countries 
of Eastern Europe shared is the RTT. Their influence extends beyond the extrication 
process because they established the institutional foundations of the future  order, 
mainly by creating the institutional framework for free, fair and competitive elections.  
                                                 
7 Extrication is defined as the countries disentanglement from the main political properties of communist 
regimes such as dominant power positions, the comprehensive state and public control of the public sphere 
etc. This period started when the regime was challenged by opposing groups and ended when the main 
features of the new order were established  
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The impact of round tables was also important given their success to avoid violent 
forms of regime change and provide the conditions for a peaceful formation of the new 
order (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 57). Thus, the mode of extrication, in terms of the 
round table devices, seems to have affected the structure of the newly created polity.  
But, the extent to which modes of extrication led to specific structural provisions 
is left open  because of the empirical evidence that “extrication period leads to actions 
and decisions which are thoroughly contingent upon individual persons, situations and 
circumstances” (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 58). Thus, Elster, Offe and Preuss 
identify only tentative links between the mode of extrication and institutional outcomes, 
while stressing the relations between the extrication mode and the actors’ space of 
action. Their model of extrication is an actor-centered one, to the extent it develops 
along two criteria: inclusion or exclusion of the old elites and their exploitation of 
available spaces of action for investing in creating new institutions or accumulating 
power (1998: 54). 
    The assumption that the extrication form serves as a vehicle for the transfer of 
past legacies to the future, is elaborated in a systematic way in Linz and Stephen’s 
hypothesis that previous regime types determine transition paths and the availability of 
pact as a transition option (1996: 3-83). Their analytical framework to study transitions, 
in addition to previous regime types includes actor-centered variables, mainly the 
leadership base and actors who control transition, as well as context-centered variables. 
Their work is relevant to our analysis of constitution-making factors to the extent the 
previous regime, in the form of the political space it permitted in terms of pluralism, 
ideology, mobilization and leadership, the actors of transition and the context, helps us 
identify the main political actors and the negotiations they could engage in during 
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transition.  Linz and Stephen’s study suggest that the transition  to democracy in 
Hungary and Bulgaria can be summed up as respectively negotiated transition from 
mature post- totalitarianism regime and controlled transition from early post-
totalitarianism (1996: 56).  
Agh, adopts a more institutional sensitive analysis to transition. He studies the 
function of RTT around the region, maintaining it is a central transitory political 
institution with regard to its function during the extrication process and long-term 
impact on the future of the polity. He attributes to those institutions the main decisions 
like the ones that “there would be no revolution, that this change would have a lawful 
constitutional character, [but would] move ahead with this legal order progressively and 
gradually towards democratization” (Agh, 1998: 85). Moreover, utilizing Pridham’s 
differentiation between macro, meso and micro-choices (Agh,1998: 84-87), Agh asserts 
that the macro-choices were made in favor of democracy by the RTT (1998: 85). The 
RTT were the institutions that decided about the basic arrangements and prepared the 
basis for the first elections as the foundation of the new democratic systems.  
While emphasizing the role of RTT as the main transitory institutions, Agh 
furthers the analysis of the institutional factor by studying the constitution-making 
process, which is credited for establishing the meso and micro-choices. Constitution 
making is the following sequence of the democratic institutionalization because the 
meso and micro politics could only be articulated within a political space more or less 
already arranged by macro-choices. Therefore, Agh institutional analysis establishes a 
direct relation between the round table negotiated issues and constitutional choices to 
the extent those negotiations provided the macro–choices, in which constitutional 
design had to fit in. 
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Thus, studies of Eastern Europe suggest that political actors were the main factor  
shaping constitution making. However, it also hints that constitutional choices are 
subject to the macro-choices and other structural constraints agreed upon in the round 
table talks. Therefore constitution making in Eastern Europe seem to fit to Elster’s 
definition of it as a process of both arguing and bargaining. While arguing involves 
mainly subjection of actors’ motivations to different constrains, bargaining evolves 
around the capacity of framers to push for their interest-based choices. Both the actors’ 
capacity to bargain and the need to justify their interests with arguments seem to 
depend, to a large extent, on the mode of extrication, which defines the political actors 
and their spaces for maneuvering. Constitution-making in Bulgaria and Hungary will 
provide us with empirical data to test the impact of the extrication mode, political actors 
and institutions in the process.  
 
2.3.2 Aspects of Constitution-making Relevant for Democratization  
Elgie and Zielonska further Elster’s analysis of the constitution-making process 
by establishing the criteria that Elster’s typology of constitution-making lacks. Their 
units of analysis are those aspects of constitution-making process that seem to be 
relevant for the consolidation of democracy –how long it takes to prepare the 
constitution; who takes part in the constitution drafting process; and how the final 
document is adopted (Elgie and Zielonska, 2001: 34). 
Before going into details about the significance of each aspect, it will be worth 
explaining why the constitution-making process is important. An argument could be that 
the legitimacy of the means by which the constitution is drafted and adopted, the 
constitution making, is the basis of constitution’s legitimacy. The constitution-making 
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process creates the immediate conditions in which the constitutional output then 
operates. Therefore, if the constitution making is consensual and legitimate it is very 
likely that the output will also be consensual and legitimate (Elgie and Zielonska, 2001: 
35). But, how and at what extent aspects of  constitution-making determine its 
democratization attributes?   
 
2.3.2.1 The Timing of Constitution-making   
The debate on the optimal constitution-making moment became tense following 
the collapse of communist regimes and the need to redefine the fundamental rules of 
their political system. One view advocates that a quick process is better than a slow 
process. McWhinney advocates this argument on the basis that codified constitutions 
occur, “in or immediately after a period of great public excitement and resultant public 
euphoria, when it is relatively easy to build  a certain climate of popular political 
consensus” (McWhinney, 1981: 15). Another advantage of  a quick fix solution is that 
“constitutions that are written when the relation of forces are still unclear are likely to 
counteract increasing returns to power, provide insurance to the eventual losers, and 
reduce the stakes of competition” (Przeworski, 1992: 87). Thus, quickly written 
constitutions seem to have the advantages of easily attained consensus grounded in 
public euphoria and relative stability because the actors’ yet unconsolidated interests 
facilitate their agreement on relatively fair rules.  
Although traumatic political events may bring about political consensus the 
problem remains if the public element is ripe enough to be conducive to writing a 
sustainable constitution. The opposite view on the optimal constitution-making moment 
emphasizes that  a constitutional settlement can be achieved after a long process of 
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bargaining. Because stable constitutions require the achievement of consensus among 
contending political forces, the writing process should be long enough to allow the 
political actors reach a sustainable agreement. Thus, a long process of negotiation seems 
to have the advantages of sustainability. 
The problem with a long process of bargaining, however, is that given the crisis 
of legitimacy plaguing all communist regimes and the volatility of the post-communist 
condition, countries could hardly afford to prolong the process of bargaining on the new 
rules. It would risk leaving their political systems fall prey to uncertainty , at best, and 
to chaos, at worst. Therefore, in most of the countries across the region there was an 
emergent need to redefine the rules of the game.  
The intermediate position advocates an interim solution. As Holmes puts it  “new 
democracies may benefit considerably from quickly adopting an interim constitution, 
while work continues on  a permanent constitution” (Elgie and Zielonska, 2001: 36). 
This view maintains that a long period may be necessary to reach agreement on a 
complete set of rules, but it also asserts that it is necessary that some rules be functional 
as soon as possible. Interim constitutions have the advantages of both a quick and 
prolonged constitution-making process. It also seems to reduce the problems each 
approach has. 
  The interim constitution embodies the  macro-choices of democratic regime, 
facilitates institutional change and frames political actors’ negotiation on meso and 
micro choices. It internalizes into the system the major demands of the democratic 
revolution without falling prey of mass euphoria because it allows for the evolution of 
rules in the form of ongoing bargaining. Thus, the interim constitutions’ long run 
advantage is leaving open the options for change and adaptation, while framing them 
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within already established macro-choices. This seems to be important, especially given 
the rapidly changing socio-political environment in post-communist countries.  
The interim settlement, however, does not go unchallenged. One of the problems 
with the interim constitution  is reflected in Schmitter’s concern that a long period of 
constitution-making may reduce the possibility of attaining consensus, because with the 
passing of time, irreconcilable political interests can be clearly formulated and 
consolidated (Schmitter, 1998: 8). On the other hand, the adoption of some rules may 
simply dwindle the momentum for adopting a constitution.   
As this debate makes clear, each solution with regard to the timing of the 
constitution making has its advantages as well as its disadvantages concerning 
democratization. Moreover, the time variable seems to be far from deterministic. The 
legitimacy and stability of the constitution depends from a set of factors rather than 
merely the timing of the process. However, as Elgie and Zielonska suggest, the adoption 
of interim institutions, where final drafts were not adopted, seemed to be indispensable 
(2001: 37).  
As such, constitution–making in Hungary and Bulgaria will serve to illustrate 
some of the advantages and disadvantages of quick fixed and interim constitutions 
rather than establish correlation between timing and democratization.   
    
2.3.2.2 Constitutional Framers 
The legitimacy of the constitution seems to depend, to some extent, on who takes 
part in its design and how representative the framing body is. More representative 
constitution-makers are, more legitimacy the constitution will have. Therefore, the 
actors that are formally assigned the duty of drafting the constitution matter.  
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In addition to who participates and their representativeness, how framers fulfill 
the constitution-making task seems to be important in terms of legitimizing its product. 
In democracies there are two basic methods: making a constitution by a constituent 
assembly and   by an ordinary legislature. They differ from each other from the duties 
they have to perform. A constituting assembly is primarily charged with creating a new 
constitution and it is dissolved after its adoption. Such was the assembly that drafted the 
Bulgarian constitution in June 1991. The national assembly, on the other hand, is 
charged with designing a constitution while functioning as a legislative body. It 
continues to do so after the adoption of the constitution.  
The debate on the optimal type of framers evolves mainly around the constituent 
assembly and legislature. Some advocate the convention of an ad hoc assembly, which 
has the sole task of drawing up the constitution of an emerging regime. The argument 
behind this position is that constitution making is a very important moment in the 
history of a country because it makes the fundamental choices of the future polity, 
therefore, those carrying this task should be selected exclusively. Ackerman, for 
example, supports the American model of a constitutive assembly because it provides 
the constitution with the highest degree of political legitimacy and prevents the dangers 
of endless constitutional tinkering and the mixing of constitutional law with ordinary 
legislation (Ackerman, 1992: 37).  
On the opposite side, Arato argues that the American model is superior only in 
theory, because  it is difficult in modern cultural and institutional conditions to  imitate 
18th century American choices. As such the second best option is parliamentary 
constitution making (Elgie and Zielonska, 2001: 38).  
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Most of the countries in Eastern Europe adopted the second option. The case of 
Hungary will illustrate the example of a constitution, which was amended to the extent 
that it amounted to a new constitution by the non-elected parliament. Bulgaria is one of 
the few cases, which called a special constitutive convention to formulate its new 
constitution. Both the case of Hungary and Bulgaria seem to conform to Elgie and 
Zielonska’s findings that Eastern Europe’s experience does not provide sufficient 
evidence to claim that certain groups of framers are likely to generate a special kind of 
political legitimacy” (2001: 39).  
 
2.3.2.3 The Ratification of Constitution  
The ratification of constitution can also be important, mainly because 
constitutions require a special kind of legitimacy, which transcends the normal law. 
Thus, the argument goes that since democratic constitutions are supposed to be a kind 
of social contract, referendum, by giving to the people the right to make the final 
decision, solidifies constitutions consensual character. Referendum combines the 
representative and direct elements of democracy. More correctly, it supplements the 
representative version of decision making by involving the people. 
In the context of Eastern Europe, the debate on referendum was a major issue. In 
addition to raising the legitimizing question, the debate on referendum evolved around 
revolutionary circumstances and consequent greater demands for referendum. 
Ackerman is among the loud advocators of referendum on the basis that if lacking a 
direct mandate from the people “the constitutionalization of revolution can not occur” 
(1992)     
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The opposing view uses the revolutionary environment to articulate a different 
argument. They refuse the adoption of constitution by referendum on the basis that 
revolutionary circumstances increase the chances for referendum to be abused. A highly 
unstable situation and a public, which by and large lacks the political culture of 
participation and self-decision make the referendum vulnerable to manipulation. 
Empirical  studies across Eastern Europe provide ample evidence of irregularities in the 
referendum procedures, which hampered constitutions legitimacy. Therefore, a formal 
referendum does not say much about constitution’s legitimacy 
In Hungary, the issue of referendum was not even raised because a formally new 
constitution is not agreed upon yet. In Bulgaria, a referendum was pre-arranged, but it 
was then called off mainly because of the fear of the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party 
which was the dominating force in the constitutive assembly) that the opposition could 
mobilize the population against the referendum. However, the fact that the constitution 
was not endorsed by public vote has hardly affected it’s functioning.  
 
2.4 Bulgaria: A Controlled and Quick-fixed Constitutional Agreement 
The Bulgarian case can illustrate the benefits and disadvantages of a quick-fixed 
constitution designed by a constitutive assembly. In addition to offering useful insights 
on the constitution-making process, mainly timing and type of framers, Bulgaria can 
illustrate how the past, the actors involved and institutions at place effected 
constitutional choices and how in return institutions reflect but also escape the 
intentions of their creators. Finally, Bulgaria’s new constitution seems to have been 
attributed the role of “the first episode in a large scale engineering, which was an 
indispensable step towards democratization” (Ganev, 2001: 193).  
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The Bulgarian constitution–making will be studied in three parts. The first part 
looks at Bulgaria’s immediate past in order to identify the transition actors, their 
negotiating capacities and the consequent transition paths. Then we proceed with the 
study of round table negotiations as an important transitory institution, which set the 
rules for the first elections, the presidency and the adoption of the new constitution, thus 
making the macro-choices of the future regime. Finally, we will study the dynamics of 
constitution-making process and the impact it had in structuring the future of the new 
polity.  
 
2.4.1 Controlled Transition 
As we have argued before, the past is an important factor influencing transition 
and the institutional choices that shape the future. While the past deserves a detailed 
study because one can invoke historical arguments going back into centuries, because of 
the limited task of this study, we will focus at those elements of Bulgaria’s immediate 
past, which can be given credit for the element of continuity in its transition to 
democracy.  
A systemic analysis of the Bulgarian previous regime is provided in Linz and 
Stephen’s work on transition to democracy. The argument underlying their study of 
Bulgaria is that “the early post-totalitarian regime initiated and never lost control of the 
transition and that the leaders of that regime emerged from the first free elections not 
only with a plurality of the vote but also with a newly reconstituted claim to power” 
(1996: 335). In spite of some pacted elements of the Bulgarian transition, it was mainly 
a reform transition. Moreover, the political elite of transition is attributed a 
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‘consumptive’ exploitation of the emerging space for action, which amounts to their 
accumulation of power (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 59).  
By 1987, in parallel to the Russian perestroika and glasnost, the General 
Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) initiated the economic 
reconstruction program and some steps towards liberalization. But, these reforms 
remained marginal and the opposition emerged as an effective force only by 1989. As 
power is relational, the weakness of the opposition meant strength for regime forces. 
Thus, in terms of pluralism, Bulgaria unlike Hungary still approximated totalitarian 
ideal type in 1988.  
In November 1989, Zhivkov’s communist regime had officially ended as a result 
of an internal party coup engineered by the communist party members. By then, some 
independent groups had already emerged. Ecoglasnost, for example, became the first 
group capable to carry out coordinated public protests against the regime in October -
November 1989. However, the opposition forces were weak and Zhivkov was forced 
out of office only to be replaced by another committed communist leader like 
Mladenov. At the beginning, Mladenov had limited intentions for reform, but being 
faced with growing popular pressure he felt obliged to take some steps towards 
liberalization. One of the most important of those steps was the removal of article 1 of 
the constitution, which declared the communist party to be the sole political force. More 
importantly, the regime forces entered into limited negotiations with the opposition 
(Bell, 1993: 83-97). 
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2.4.2 RTT and Continuity 
Talks between the regime forces and the opposition started in January 1990. A 
characteristic of Bulgarian RTT, which underscores the element of continuity was that a 
member of the Communist Party, Lukanov, was the one who coordinated the 
preparatory meetings, presided over the talks, determined the agenda and guided the 
discussion (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 338). Thus, the Bulgarian negotiations were in 
marked contrast with the Hungarian ones, where the democratic opposition held its own 
talks and set the principles of negotiation with the government before they even agreed 
to enter into negotiations with the government forces.  
However, the Bulgarian case, at least partly, confirms Giddens’ assumption that 
institutions escape the narrow interests of their creators. In the same line of argument, 
Agh suggests that RTT were a device for negotiations, which in spite of the dominance 
of former communists, served as a constituent assembly (1998: 85). Thus, although the 
RTT were initiated and presided over by the former regime representatives, the talks 
culminated in a series of agreements, which included concessions to the regime forces 
but also real compromises between the two parts.  
The RTT evolved around issues that crystallized change. The issues on the 
agenda were mainly on the nature and power of the presidency, the timing of elections, 
the choice of the electoral system (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 69). The regime 
negotiators had their way on the timing of first free elections as the parts agreed to have 
early elections in June 1990, although the fledging opposition would have preferred a 
latter date in order to have time to organize. The electoral system that was agreed upon 
was a compromise between majority voting asked for by the communists and 
proportional voting demanded by the opposition. Another concession to the opposition 
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was agreeing upon a weak president, although the regime negotiators would have 
preferred a strong presidency on the assumption the communist candidate would fill it. 
Mladenov agreed to become the president until the first elections for  the national 
assembly, which was also charged with promulgating a new constitution within only 18 
months.  
Thus, the RTT set the framework for democratic change and founded the basis 
for institutional transformation at the same time they served as a bridge to relate the past 
with the future because of being dominated from ex-communists.  
 
2.4.3 Constitution-Making and its Impact on the New Polity  
In the first elections of June 1990, The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which 
was the communist party with a changed label, emerged as the main victor able to 
control the constitutive assembly. The main task of the assembly was to draw up a new 
constitution, but by the beginning of 1991 there was little progress in that direction, 
mainly because BSP was interested to postpone the round of the next elections. The 
opposition, whose main party was the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) took a 
critical position by blaming BSP for postponing the adoption of the new constitution 
against the promise it gave to the electorate.  President Zhelev, from the opposition, 
who had replaced the communist one following his resignation in August 1990, exerted 
pressure on the assembly to agree upon a constitutional settlement immediately. He 
even set a deadline –July 1991. BSP facing pressure from both the public, opposition, 
and the president concentrated on constitution making and observed the deadline set by 
the president. When adopted in July 1991, it became the very first wholly new 
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constitution to be adopted in the region. The solution came fairly quickly, but it 
remained to be seen what it had fixed and what it had not.  
Although there were talks for a referendum, the constitution was adopted by the 
assembly given its fears that the public could have failed to endorse the document. 
Thus, the referendum called at the beginning was called off. In addition, the constitution 
was not ratified unanimously by the assembly. The opposition was highly critical to the 
constitution. Most of the radical deputies of UDF and all the deputies of the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which represented the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
were either absent or voted against the constitution. Other groups abstained. Some 
radicals in parliament even went in hunger strike as  a sign of protest. In any case, the 
constitution was approved by 309 out of 400 votes (Verheijen, 1999: 105-153). 
As a matter of fact the Bulgarian constitution has been criticized in many 
respects. In addition for being blamed for rapid work Elster, Offe and Preuss argue that 
the document has more than its share of ambiguities and inconsistencies and in some 
respects it is also quite illiberal, reflecting the communist dominance in the assembly 
(1998: 74). The illiberal provisions can be mainly found on issues of minority rights. 
Ethnic groups are prohibited to create political parties and do not have the right to study 
in their own language. MRF stiffly opposed the constitution on the grounds that it failed 
to protect minority rights. Other provisions in the constitution are criticized on the 
grounds they reflect the  interest of former communists to protect themselves against 
criminal prosecution and demands for restitution of property (Elster, Offe and Preuss: 
1998: 74). 
In addition to the above conundrums Ganev identifies some problems, which 
provoked attempts to change the constitution. For example, the constitution does not 
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contain any solution on governance during the interim periods between two 
governments, which can lead to risks of an unbridled executive power. Reflecting the 
hypothesis on institutions interest, Ganev also suggests that the assembly assured for 
itself a clear supremacy versus the president, although the president is popularly elected 
(2001: 186-211). However, the constitution proved to be sustainable and those problems 
were never synthesized in concrete proposals and amendment initiatives. According to 
Ganev, the working of constitution is made possible by a shared perception among both 
party leaders and the citizenry that “ambitious projects to revamp the constitution are 
likely to generate marginal benefits at best, while levying incalculable costs on society 
as a whole” (2001: 192). 
Despite problems with constitution making and its output there is plenty of 
evidence that Bulgaria is a functioning democratic system. Looking from the 
perspective of previous regime type, Linz and Stephan hypothesize that Bulgaria’s 
“over performance” in democratic terms can be explained by its institutional choices –
initial use of the parliamentary framework and its continued use of proportional 
representation (1996: 342).  
In the same line of argument, the early constitutional settlement can be attributed 
an important function in the democratization process.  First, it has injected stability and 
predictability in the very volatile post-communist environment. Although UDF and 
president Zhelev refused to endorse the constitution, they soon found themselves 
victorious in the October 1991 elections organized under the auspices of the 
constitution. Thus, as Ganev argues, the most significant success of a quick-fixed 
solution was achieved –peaceful transition of power (2001: 192). 
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Second, the Bulgarian constitution seems to have stimulated some democratic 
behavior and a minimum of respect among elites by institutionalizing incentives for 
elite behavior. The general framework of rules and procedures set up in the constitution 
has served to channel the animous interest-ridden behavior into norm-patterned 
interaction. At the very least, the constitution assisted into the creation of a new political 
discourse, through which political parties struggle for power. The new, institutionalized 
and rule framed political discourse has contributed to the normalization of irreconcilable 
controversies.  
Third, by specifying and balancing the roles of each branch of government the 
Bulgarians avoided institutional chaos and a possible tyranny of the majority. Judiciary 
independence rooted in constitution has successfully stalled some attempts from BSP to 
tip the balance in their favor, as it did by declaring void an effort of BSP led parliament 
to curtail the powers of president.  
Finally, the constitution seems to have enhanced democratic inclusion in terms of 
accepting a broad array of individual and minority rights. In addition to all classical 
rights the Bulgarians are blessed with comprehensive social rights (2001: 197). An 
example illustrating the inclusion of previously excluded minorities in the political 
process and their right to claim protection is the case when the constitutional court 
refused to declare unconstitutional the MRF. Although the protection of MRF was 
related to the independence of the judiciary rather than constitution itself,  it would not 
have been possible without the constitution’s role in designing roles and practices. This 
confirms to Ganev findings that constitution has played the role of scaffolding around 
which new institutional practices coalesce (2001: 199). 
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2.5 Hungary: A Negotiated and Evolutionary Constitutional Arrangement 
Hungary has been one of the most studied countries among the post-communist 
transitions because of its negotiated transition and its very complex process of 
constitution-making. Most of the analysis of the Hungarian constitutional transition 
evolves around the actors’ capacity of negotiating, the institutional choices they adopted 
and the flexible constitutional framework they used.  
Although there is little disagreement that Hungary proved to be among the most 
successful cases in terms of its democratic achievements, the problem, as Szikinger 
argues, is that “the declaration of  universally accepted constitutional values was 
codified and institutionalized with dubious political legitimacy” (2001: 406). This 
discrepancy between successful democratization and problematic legitimacy of the rules 
of political game makes Hungary an interesting case for elucidating the main question 
of this study –does any sort of constitution-making produce a workable democratic 
system? Put differently, Hungary can help us explain the extent to which constitution-
making process impacts the future of democratic polity.  
 Hungary  shows that the question is not straightforward. The constellation of 
variables like past regime type, the actors involved and the institutional choices at the 
very beginning of transition help us understand the constitutional choice –an interim, 
malleable constitution agreed upon by the old and new elites, and which served well 
during the transition process. However, the process itself, in terms of utilizing a 
constitution adopted by a non –elected assembly and leaving open the choice of a final 
settlement has put into question the democratic attributes of constitution making in 
Hungary.   
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The constitution-making process in Hungary differs from Bulgaria whose 
constitution was adopted by a democratically elected constitutive assembly in the 
course of only 18 months. These different choices seem to have produced different 
results. While it is argued  that the Bulgarian constitution constricted and normalized 
the political conflict, Hungary’s constitutional settlement left ample space for the 
domination of partisan interests of  political elite  in the political process.  
The case that democracy does not fare better in Bulgaria than in Hungary, 
however, suggests that other factors are at play in addition to constitutional making. 
Having said this, we accept that constitution making cannot, solely, be invested with 
democratization tasks.  The analysis of factors like previous regime, actors and 
institutional choices helps us explain  Hungary’s successful transition to democracy in 
spite of a questioned constitution-making solution.  
This study of Hungary proceeds in a chronological order but concentrates on the 
factors influencing constitutional choices and the process itself. The first part looks at 
previous regime type in Hungary and identifies the political actors and agendas that 
affected the course of events. The marked difference between Hungary and Bulgaria is 
that at the moment of change, Hungary had a well-organized political opposition, while 
the moderates were already at the helm of the communist party. The second part 
analyzes round table agreements, which set the background for an evolutionary 
constitution making. The important constitutional choices agreed upon in RTT set the 
direction and the limits of consequent steps of constitution making. The third part aims 
at explaining the advantages and disadvantages of Hungary’s pliable interim 
constitution and the prolonged final agreement.  
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2.5.1 The Resurgence of Opposition   
There has always been resistance to the communist regime in Hungary. The 
failed revolution of 1956 was one of the symbols of this resistance. The successor of the 
executed leader of the 1956 revolution, Kadar proved to be a soft communist and 
advocated  political alliance claiming that  “those who are not against us are with us” 
(Linz and Stephan, 1996: 298). In addition, he lunched several reforms, mainly in the 
economic realm. The new economic mechanism introduced in 1986 proved to be the 
most pervasive experiment of any communist country with market economy. Extensive 
changes, however, started with the inclusion of the 1968 reforms in constitution. The 
new electoral law on competitive elections adopted in 1983 was another major 
movement in the direction of liberalization (Agh, 1995: 299). Despite these changes, the 
communist party  retained its unchallenged leading role.  
By mid 1980’s, however, the economic policies of Kadar came under strong 
criticism. On the one hand, a reform wing, which was led by Pozsgay developed within 
the party itself. On the other hand, several independent groups started coming into 
existence. By October 1987, the first opposition group, the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (HDF) had its organizational convention. Among a plethora of social movements 
that developed in Hungary by late 80’s, those who had political inclinations emerged as 
protopolitical parties like the Federation of Young Democrats and the Network of Free 
initiatives. Moreover, there was a sort of mutual support between the party moderates 
and emerging groups, which strengthened them both. Potzsgay, for example 
participated in the organizational meeting of HDF (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 302).  
The new law on associations passed by the parliament in early 1989 was 
followed by the emergence of three political organizations. Hence, a de facto multi 
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party political system   came into being within the framework of the one party system in 
Hungary. This limited pluralism brought about significant consequences. Once the 
process had started neither the government nor the parliament could control the course 
of events. Agh argues that during the 1988-1989 period the opposition was able to block 
the adoption of a new constitutional draft prepared by the government on the basis that 
no institution was legitimate enough to adopt  a new constitution (1995: 301).  
 
2.5.2 RTT and the September Pact 
What imparted the Hungarian transition with its negotiated pact characteristics, 
therefore, is the existence of  both a political opposition and moderate reformers within 
the regime, who had the capacity to negotiate. Moreover, both parties had all the 
reasons to find common solutions given the uncertainty of situation and fear for their 
future. As Linz and Stephan put it, negotiation became the preferred possibility for both 
moderate players because both sides knew they could not triumph by their own efforts 
alone, both recognized the depth of the social and economic crises and both feared what 
a repeat of 1956 would to their future” (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 306). 
 By mid 1989, the regime forces decided to enter negotiations with the 
opposition. RTT were held between 13 June and 18 September. Differently from the 
case of Bulgaria, the opposition showed signs of maturity and strength by refusing to 
negotiate separately, and by creating first the opposition’s own round table. The main 
decision in the oppositions’ roundtable was that their purpose would not be to share 
power but to arrive at free elections (Linz and Stephan, 1996: 307). Consequently, the 
parties to the negotiations were regime reformers and a unified opposition movement.  
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 The main thrust of the agreement was the creation of multi party constitutional 
democracy. The contentious issues evolved around electoral procedure and presidential 
elections and powers. Concerning the electoral system, quite similar to the Bulgarian 
case, the communists opted for majoriatarian elections, while the opposition forces 
supported proportional system. The agreement was a middle way encompassing both 
majoritarian and proportional elements.  
 With regard to the presidency the contending issues were the timing and the 
powers of the president. Communists, on the assumption that no one could match the 
popularity of their candidate, Potzsguy preferred a direct election before the Assembly 
was elected. The opposition asked that the presidential election take place after the 
general elections and opted for limited presidential powers. The agreement was a 
concession to communists demands, but it did not materialize because parts of the 
opposition were able to initiate a referendum, which decided that the president be 
elected after the parliament. Thus, the final result was different from the roundtable 
agreement and the presidency went to a politician from the opposition, elected by the 
new parliament (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 67).  In addition, the parties agreed upon 
the establishment of a strong parliament and Constitutional court.  
 A major difference between Hungary and Bulgaria is that unlike Bulgaria where 
constitutional choices were left to the new parliament, in Hungary the RTT turned into a 
quasi-constitutional assembly (Szikinger, 2001: 410). In the course of creating a 
framework for transition the discussion of constitutional amendments prevailed over 
other issues. The agreement reached in RTT was crystallized in the form of  
constitutional amendments when the parliament sanctioned it without any substantial 
changes. 
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In this respect, the new amendments were a quick fix solution reached in a period 
inclined to consensus. According to Elster constitution-makers “exploited a window of 
opportunity –a short period during which the communists remained demoralized and the 
opposition was not yet seriously divided” (Elster, 1993: 167-217). 
 However, the 1989 constitution was intended to be an interim framework to 
promote change. As Agh argues, its transitory character can be found in two main 
solutions. First, the predominant role of the parliament in passing most of laws with  a 
qualified majority, which means in fact the establishment of a constitutional assembly 
for managing the political transition, and second going beyond Hungarian constitutional 
transitions with respect to the rights of the president, investing him with the role of 
safeguarding democracy (1995: 304). 
 
2.5.3 Dubious Legitimacy and a Prolonged Interim Solution   
The 1989 interim constitutional settlement proved to be an important milestone 
in the transition process by setting the basis of a peaceful and negotiated democratic 
transition. It was also agreed upon in the RTT encompassing a broad spectrum of the 
Hungarian political forces, which has imparted it with some degree of legitimacy.  
But, the legitimacy of its making as well as its capacity to meet the challenges of 
democratization has not gone unchallenged. First, the 1989 constitution has remained a 
source of political conflict because of the legitimacy problem associating the moment of 
its genesis. Being the product of elite negotiations in amending the communist 
constitution of 1949 and sanctioned by a non-elected parliament the Hungarian 
constitution lacks the legitimacy associated with an elected constituent assembly or 
popular endorsement by referendum.  In the words of Szikinger, “the present day 
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constitution is a result of bargain between the old and new elite. [] The fact that the 
subject of the constitution is narrowed down causes damage to the credibility and 
acceptance of the constitution” (2001: 414). Thus it seems to miss the necessary chain 
of consensus  that links democratic politics with the society.  
Moreover, the 1989 constitution, which turned to be permanent, embodies all the 
problems of a transitory constitution that was intended to manage the rapid political and 
economic change for a short period of transition. The flexibility the constitution is 
purposely blessed with, has led to a situation where interpretation and necessary 
constitutional modifications can be made without enormous difficulty. The best 
examples of  disregard for constitutionalised structures are the 11 amendments of the 
constitution since 1989 (Szikinger, 2001: 414). Thus, the constitution remains a tool of 
a small elite and can easily fall prey to actors’ self-interest. It still is the case that 
“partisan interests dominate parliamentary debates in Hungary excluding any chance for 
outside actors to have a significant impact on decision-making” (Szikinger, 2001: 418). 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Both our case studies reinforce the argument that the mode of extrication, the 
concerns of the political authors involved in the process and the institutional settlements 
at the beginning of transition are the main factors to influence constitution- making. In 
Hungary, the negotiated pact transition, the powerful opposition and the round table 
agreements shaped the constitutional process and the choices embedded in the 
constitutional amendments of 1989. Controlled transition and the dominant power of 
communist reformers in Bulgaria, can also explain some of the conundrums inherent in 
the Bulgarian brand new constitution. The round table negotiations taking place in both 
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countries at the beginning of the transition, were the one to decide upon the 
fundamental macro choices, in which meso and micro choices left to constitution-
makers had to fit in.  
However, both cases do also illustrate the case that institutions, hence 
constitutional settlements, can escape the interests of their framers. The provisions on a 
strong presidency or majoritarian electoral systems, pushed for by communist 
negotiators in both round table talks, were not adopted exactly as they were agreed 
upon.  
Aspects of the constitution-making process like the timing, the body of framers 
and the way of adoption, on the other hand, seem to have limited explanation power in 
terms of democratization in Eastern Europe. The fact that Hungary has not yet adopted a 
new constitution  has not hampered the process of democratization comparing with 
Bulgaria, whose new constitution was among the first to be adopted in all Eastern 
Europe. At the same time, although Hungary’s constitutional amendments were agreed 
upon by the RTT and were passed by a non–elected parliament, democracy in Hungary 
does not fare worst than in Bulgaria, whose constitution was drafted by a freely elected 
constitutive assembly. Aspects of constitution-making process, as such, can hardly be 
associated with definite democratization attributes. Both cases illustrate that there is not 
an optimal constitution-making process in term of its democratic credentials, thus 
showing the limits  of institutional engineering.  
This is not to say, however, that the constitution-making process does not matter. 
My findings are limited to Eastern Europe, whose post–communist political condition 
creates a rather unique environment. Aspects of constitution–making may have more 
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significance in other political environments. Consequently, the study of constitution–
making process should be case sensitive.   
Although Eastern Europe experience does not provide enough evidence to define 
an optimal constitution–making process it shows the advantages of quickly adopting the 
main rules of the political game. Be it interim or permanent, new constitutional 
settlements influence the democratization process to the extent they provide the rules 
for the peaceful and democratic transfer of power, create a general framework of rules, 
which if  do not channel the behavior of the political actors provide a space of discourse 
and rules the political actors continuously refer to.  Thus, in spite of its share of 
problems associated with hastily agreeing upon the fundamental rules of the polity, both 
Hungary and Bulgaria constitutionalised the main achievements of the peaceful 
democratic revolution and profited from the existence of a general set of rules in several 
ways.  
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CHAPTER III: 
THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONS’ EFFECTIVENESS ON 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The second chapter shows that constitutions’ impact on democratization  is not 
straightforward. Constitution–making is an intermediate variable, which may foster or 
inhibit democratization. This chapter intends to consolidate the argument that the 
correlation between constitutions and democratization is complex, by introducing 
another intermediate variable, which effects democratization: constitutions’ 
performance. Thus, the specific question of this chapter is whether the effectiveness of 
constitutions accounts for different records of democratic progress. My hypothetical 
answer is that democratic attributes of constitutions are contingent upon their 
effectiveness.  
Many studies of democratization maintain that the design of constitutions is 
important  on the assumption that the constitutional frameworks create the main 
institutional incentives of the political system. In reality, however, the correlation 
between constitutional choices and democratization seem to be a matter of degree rather 
than a definite equation. The question on the optimal constitutional design is an open 
ended question because of two reasons: First, the constitutional text may embody  UN–
democratic provisions; Second, the constitution can be poorly implemented because  
they are a tool among many for democratic builders to use with greater or lesser skills. 
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Both the legal quality of the constitutional texts and their application in reality serve to 
operationalize the concept of constitutional effectiveness.  
The first part of this chapter helps us define  the two levels of studying 
constitutional effectiveness: legal texts and the implementation process. The second 
part, is an effort to define effectiveness and its indicators. The third part consists in the 
textual analysis of constitutions, with reference to human rights and the principle of 
check and balances. It addresses the optimal design question: is there any choice that 
automatically leads to democratization? The fourth part is concerned with the question 
of limits to institutional engineering by pointing to the gap between constitutional 
provisions on paper and in reality. I make use of the survey data collected from New 
European Barometer during 2001, to evaluate the performance of constitutions as they 
are experienced in their constituents daily life.  
My findings suggest that although there are minor problems with constitutional 
provisions, they have imparted their regimes with the fundamental characteristics of 
democratic regimes. However, the lack of the rule of law in the governing process  
seems to be  a major obstacle to democratization. Thus, constitutional provisions can 
hardly attributed  a definite role  in engineering their democratic systems.   
 
3.2 The impact of Constitutions in Terms of Effectiveness 
 
 3.2.1 Effectiveness as a Variable Legitimizing the New Democratic Systems 
People in post-communist countries have a long experience with regimes 
different from democracy. Therefore, there is a shortage of political culture associated 
with democracy. Moreover, the post-communist transition, which was initiated and 
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undertaken mainly from non-elected previous regime elites or opposition seem to carry 
dubious legitimacy. In this context, support for democracy is shaky and dependent on 
the performance of the new regimes, and the constitutions that set up their main 
characteristics. Thus, success of the new constitutions is very important in establishing 
the overall legitimacy of the new political systems.  
Efficient democratic constitutions foster legitimacy by promising people what 
they want their political entity to have, and by putting into place firm rules for political 
conduct, which are rightly observed. Hence, efficiency is one of the main chains 
connecting new constitutions to democratization.  
 
3.2.2 Two Levels of Evaluating Constitutional Effectiveness 
Many studies of post-communist transitions focus on the impact of new 
constitutional settlements on the democratization process. Most of them implicitly refer 
to the performance of the constitutional choices, but there are very few works, which 
make effectiveness the central argument of their studies. Moreover, there is little 
consensus on the criteria employed to determine constitutional effectiveness. 
Seemingly, the definition and determination of constitutional effectiveness is neither 
easy, nor straightforward. 
The body of literature, which builds on analyzing constitutional success, can be 
divided into three main streams. On the one hand, there are those studies, which engage 
in the textual analysis of constitutions. On the other hand, many studies seek to argue 
that the implementation of the constitutional design, rather than the design itself, is the 
key aspect of democratization. The intermediate position maintains that constitutional 
texts are and are not relevant. Constitutional norms are important because they define 
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the founding principles of the regime and mechanisms to protect the constitutional 
promises. However, it makes a difference whether legal devices are or are not observed 
in reality. The way legal norms are obeyed to by political authorities, has its own share 
in explaining the effectiveness of the set norms. 
On the assumption that certain constitutional provisions produce certain political 
results, Elster, Offe and Preuss analyze the legal quality of constitutional texts with 
reference to human rights, structure of government, constitutional courts, amendment 
rules and electoral laws (1998: 81).  Stephan and Skach study the consequences of a 
narrower ,but extensively studied issue of institutional design: parliamentarism versus 
presidentialism, which consist in different structural arrangements for the separation 
and balance of governmental branches (1993). They bring quantitative evidence, based 
on cross-national and time-series data, to illustrate their argument that there is a much 
stronger correlation between democratic consolidation and pure parliamentarism. Their 
strong support for parliamentarism lies in its tendencies like:  
greater propensities for governments to have majorities to implement their 
programs; its greater ability to rule in a multiparty setting; its lower propensity 
for executives to rule at the edge of constitution and its greater facility at 
removing a chief executive who does so, its lower susceptibility to military 
coups; and its greater tendency to provide long party government careers, which 
add loyalty and experience to political society (Stephan and Skach, 1993: 22).  
 
The works of Elster, Offe and Preuss and Stephan and Skach suggest that success 
of constitutions depend on the extent to which constitutions embody the right 
institutional choices.  
Elgie and Zielonska, in the same vein, seek to answer the fundamental question 
on whether certain constitutional products guarantee better prospects for democratic 
consolidation (2001: 25-48). They put forward the argument that different types of 
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constitutional products, deliberately chosen by constitutional framers, have implications 
for the political system. However, the data set from post-communist institutional 
choices proves to be inconclusive to the extent they claim that “we are not close to the 
hyper rational ideal for designing institutions…. The transferability of set constitutional 
rules collides with the particularistic political cultures.” (Elgie and Zielonska, 2001: 45).  
Their work praises the work on institutional choices, but also introduces the idea of 
limits to institutional engineering. Mere texts can not be attributed a conclusive 
explanatory power of the democratization process. Consequently, constitutional 
performance should transcend the study of right provisions.  
Evans and Whitefield conform to the intermediate position among design and 
implementation by studying both institutional structures and the operation of these 
structures as assessed by the constituents of the political system. According to them, the 
set of institutional structures in itself does not build up democracy. Institutional 
structures assist or inhibit democratization to the extent they determine people’s 
experiences with democracy. The institutional factors, which explain democratic 
commitment are: the degree to which constitutional arrangements were in place, the 
level of institutional conflict between branches of government, the development of the 
party systems and the outcome of the elections (Evans and Whitefield: 495).  The main 
indicator of effectiveness is people’s evaluations. Thus, Evans and Whitefield’s 
parameters to measure effectiveness  are people’s evaluations on the way their 
institutions work.  
The gap between constitutional promises and the reality is also Davenports dual 
concern in studying political and civil rights. His conclusions remain somewhere in 
between the opposing views that constitutions provide the guiding principles of 
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government, on the one hand, and that they look good but they do nothing, on the other 
hand. Davenport brings statistical evidence to support his argument that constitutions 
provide some insights into how governments will behave. He proposes to “read” 
national constitutions in two manners: identify rights that are explicitly mentioned and 
the limits put in each” (1996: 645). His findings based on a large pool of cross-national 
and time- series comparison suggest that “a regime that has made a constitutional 
promise is more likely to stay to that commitment” (1996: 648).   
The works of  Elgie and Zielonska,  Evans and Whitefield and Davenport points 
to the problem that constitutional provisions are relevant for democratization, but while 
put into practice, they are subject to interpretation. Thus, their studies bridge the studies 
built on the assumption of institutional engineering with the ones emphasizing the way 
the constitutional design is implemented.  
The opposite view of institutional engineering maintains that legal norms may 
look good, but may also do nothing. To put it in a Russian saying “the law is like a door 
in the middle of the field. You can go through it if you want, but you do not have to” 
(Rose, 1997: 92-112). Thus, the implementation rather than constitutional design itself 
is the key aspect of democratic consolidation.  
Defining democracy as the rule of law, free elections and enjoyment of political 
rights and liberties, Rose argues that merely holding free elections will not lead post-
communist countries towards democratization (Rose, 1997: 94). For him, the greatest 
obstacle to democracy is the absence of the rule of law, as shown by the prevailing 
phenomena of exploitation of public office for private profits. In Rose’s own words, 
“today, corruption is the main cause of departures from the rule of law. The problems of 
minorities or emigrants are real, but they affect only limited groups in the population. 
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By contrast, corruption affects most citizens” (Rose, 1997: 1001). Based on problems 
such as corruption, which extends beyond law provisions to the way they are 
manipulated in the hands of political elites, Rose seems to be able to argue that 
democratization is a function of the way laws are implemented rather than dependent on 
good democratic laws. His analysis is relevant to the extent that he argues constitutional 
frameworks fell short of explaining politics of post-communist Europe, but he pushes it 
too far while excluding the ability of constitutions to shape the level of discourse and 
the institutional mechanisms actors cannot totally and always bypass.   An important 
element of Rose’s work, however, is making use of mass evaluations on political 
transformations their countries are undergoing.  
Most of the literature, which focuses on implementation as a determinant or one 
among other factors, employs survey data as a methodological tool to measure the 
success of constitutions in terms of democratization. The work of Rose, for example, is 
extensively based on the New Europe Barometer Surveys from 16 post-communist 
countries. In the same vein, Evans and Whitefield, although operating in the intersection 
of institutional and the implementation level of analysis, consider the individuals 
experience with their democratic institutions to be the main indicator of institutional 
effectiveness.  
To sum up, studies on the impact of constitutional frameworks suggest that 
effectiveness can be perceived in two different levels, which especially as the 
intermediate approaches hold  are necessary to grasp and determine effectiveness.  Both 
legal devices set up in constitutional texts and the way constitutional settlements are put 
into practice are important to determine effectiveness.  
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Before going into the analysis of constitutions, let us first explicitly define what 
effectiveness refers to and the indicators of its effectiveness in each level.  
 
3.3 Defining Effectiveness   
Given the non-consensual use in different studies, both the definition of 
effectiveness and its determination are more difficult than it seems. An obstacle to 
defining constitution’s effectiveness  seems to be the distinction and at the same time 
the overlapping, between a political system compounded of regime and authorities and 
the constitution. However, because the implementation of constitutional rules is 
indivisible from the political authorities, the effectiveness of the system equals that of 
constitution at the level of implementation.  As both Rose and Davenport suggest, the 
main indicator of the effectiveness, at this level, are people’s negative or positive 
experiences with the institutions (see Davenport, 1996, Rose, 1997). Thus, data 
collected from survey research on people’s evaluation of their system is the main source 
of measuring effectiveness of constitutions in the implementation level.8 
The effectiveness of constitutional design, on the other hand seems to be easier 
to define but difficult to measure. Effectiveness of constitutional documents refers to 
the degree the constitutional provisions do not collide with each other and the degree 
they create mechanisms to protect, maintain and enable the principles they keep sacred. 
In this level of analysis, people’s evaluations cannot tell much because they only 
indirectly experience the constitutional rules. Elster, Offe and Preuss,  Evans and 
Whitefield and many other works suggest that the liberal constitutions tradition as well 
as political scientist research on institutional choices provides certain guidelines, if not 
                                                 
8 I will make use of survey data collected from New European Barometer   
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standards, to evaluate probabilities for constitutional success. Most of them consider 
human rights and the separation and balance of powers to be the fundamental choices 
that determine the nature of political unit. Therefore the main criteria to evaluate 
effectiveness in the textual level are the embodiment of certain choices and the lack of 
contradictions between different principles.  
 
3.4 Analysis of the Constitutional Design 
A whole generation of political scientists has struggled with the question of 
optimal constitutional design. Do certain provisions guarantee better prospects for 
democratization? If yes, which ones?  
Although the constitutional design has been an over studied subject, it seems that 
political science is far from offering one model, which entails the best choice or 
choices. The debate evolving around the implications of certain choices for the nature of 
the political entity is inconclusive. In addition to the lack of agreement on the 
consequences of certain choices, there is little agreement even on the constitutional 
provisions, which impart the political system with its essential characteristics.  
The constitutional framers face many bewildering choices. They must decide 
whether or not to include a charter of rights; they must chose what is the most 
appropriate balance and separation of powers among the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of government; they must distribute responsibilities among the units 
of government; they need to select the most fitting electoral system and make many 
other choices.  
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Different authors focus on different sets of choices9. Schmitter and Karl provide 
the most comprehensive list of 11 important dimensions that provide a matrix of 
potential combinations by which political systems can be differently democratic.10 In 
their words “no single set of institutions, practices or values embody democracy” 
(Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 81-82).  
However, some elements of constitutions seem to account more for the particular 
character of the polity. First, human rights are an indispensable element of democracy 
and the liberal constitutional tradition. The scope and character of human rights seem to 
determine the nature of the political regime. Second, structural arrangement involving 
the separation and balance of powers among the three branches of government is 
another essential choice that confronts architects of democratic constitutions. What are 
the advantages of each, and how does it work in the case of Hungary and Bulgaria? 
 
3.4.1 The Scope of Human Rights and The Mechanisms Set to Protect Them  
Today, almost every constitution contains a bill of rights entrenching civil and 
political as well as social and economic rights. Bills of rights have long been part of 
liberal constitutions. In line with the best of Western tradition and nowadays trends to 
enlarge the scope of human rights both Bulgaria and Hungary’s constitution contain an 
extensive catalogue of rights. Both constitutions have also introduced different 
mechanisms to enforce their provisions on human rights.  
                                                 
9 Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998,  define 5 different fundamental choices.  Evans and Whitefield analyze 4 
influential institutional choices. Liphart, 1993, articulates two essential issues.  
10The components, which create different democratic systems are consensus, participation,  access, 
responsiveness, majority rule,  parliamentary sovereignty, party government, pluralism, federalism, 
presidentialism and check and balances of powers.    
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Both constitutions embody a broad array of civil rights like the rights to life, 
freedom from torture, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
and the right to property. The constitutions do also guarantee the traditional political 
rights like the right to vote, to elect and to be elected, the freedom of expression, and the 
right to assemble among many others. Thus, both the Hungarian and Bulgarian 
constitutions impart their democratic regimes with a very rich pool of rights and meet 
most of the international standards.  
The rights and freedoms embedded in these constitutions seem to have a positive 
evaluation from an absolute majority of the people who experience them in their daily 
life. The opinion of Bulgarian and Hungarian citizens conforms to the overall regional 
trend of people’s high esteem for their newly gained freedoms, as expressed by a 
regional average of 79% of respondents who believe they are freer now than in the old 
regime (New European Barometer, 2001).    
However, neither Bulgaria nor Hungary is free of problems. Minority rights, for 
example, seem to be a problem in Bulgaria. Mainly directed against its Turkish 
minorities, the Bulgarian constitution prohibits the formation of parties along ethnic, 
racial or religious lines (Bulgarian Constitution, Art. 11.4, para, 3). Thus, the 
constitution is a source of limiting the representation of ethnic and religious minorities 
by restricting their right to form political parties. The problems with minority rights 
extend further to their right of education. Although the constitution stipulates the right 
of minorities to study their own language, the qualifications added to this right actually 
restrict the right of minorities to study in their own language because minorities are 
allowed to study their language as a subject not to use it as a studying language.(Elster 
and Holmes, 1992). 
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In addition to adopting an extensive bill of rights, both constitutions have created  
different mechanisms to protect the rights they envisage. One of the mechanisms both 
constitutions have opted for is the creation of the constitutional court. In each case the 
court is empowered with the right of constitutional review, which aims to control the 
conformity of laws with the constitutional norms. The Hungarian constitutional court, 
however, has been invested with more powers compared to the Bulgarian one.  
According to the Hungarian constitution, for example, citizens can appeal to the 
constitutional court alongside the political institutions, while the Bulgarian constitution 
does not provide its citizens with the same right. Moreover, according to the Hungarian 
constitution, the court can initiate the review procedure by itself (Elster, Offe and 
Preuss, 1998: 102-105).  
Another institution, which provides an extra guarantee for the protection of 
human rights, is the ombudsmen. He is given the role of representative of the people. 
Hungary’s constitution establishes two ombudsmen, one for the protection of rights of 
citizens, generally, and one for the protection of the rights of minorities in particular 
(Hungarian Constitution, Art. 32). This dual structure can be a good example to follow 
for Bulgaria, which has considerable minorities and seemingly unresolved problems 
with their group rights.  
A problem both constitutions share, however, is their tendency to overstep the 
boundaries of negative rights.11 Elster Offe and Preuss criticize the trans-liberal 
character and the extension of negative rights with a positive and protective dimension, 
on the bases that these constitutions have politicized the concept of rights (1998: 83). 
                                                 
11 Negative rights like the right to life, to property etc protect the individual against the state interference 
and are legally enforceable. Positive rights, on the other hand, are regarded as policy goals whose 
realization is contingent upon the political process.  
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The Bulgarian constitution, for example, in addition to articulating the right to life 
charges the state with “protecting human life and punishing any attempt upon human 
life” (Art. 4, para. 2). The same trend of politicizing rights is found in the Hungarian 
constitution, where the provisions about property rights, for example, are included in 
the chapter containing general provisions,  instead  of the chapter on fundamental rights 
and duties. 
Another problematic trend, reflected in both the Hungarian and Bulgarian 
constitutions, is the broad scope of positive rights, which they encompass. Both 
constitutions contain, among many others, the right to work, to unemployment benefits, 
to education, to healthy working conditions or even so called third generation rights like 
the right to a healthy and favorable environment (Elster, Offe and Preuss: 1998: 86). 
Generally lacking mechanisms for their implementation, constitutions add to the 
ambiguity and administrative discharge of their respective obligations. As Ganev puts it 
for the case of Bulgaria, “social-economic rights seem to be daily irrelevant in Bulgaria. 
They do not impose a burden on politicians, who easily disregard them” (2001: 198). 
Moreover, positive rights involve government interference, thus shift the authority of 
implementation from courts to the executive.        
 
3.4.2 The Regulation of Relations between State Agencies.  
The regulation of relations among the branches of government stands for the 
separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judiciary, which has long 
been an important principle of the liberal constitutional tradition. It is complemented by  
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the principles of check and balances, which, maintains to create a functional, fair and 
responsive political system. The American constitution of 1789 provides a typical 
example. 
Two well-known models of executive-legislative relations are presidential and 
parliamentarian systems. Stephan and Skatch argue that democratic regimes actually 
face a narrow choice that stands somewhere in between these two systems (1993: 2). 
Each of the choices consists in a different matrix of the separation of powers. The 
distinguishing feature of parliamentarian systems is that the executive is elected by and 
is responsible to the legislative, which tends to produce a system of mutual dependence 
among them. In presidential systems, by contrast, the executive and the legislative are 
elected separately and have fixed terms in office, which reinforces separation, or to put 
it differently mutual independence, between the different state agencies (Stepan and 
Skatch, 1993: 3). In addition to the mode of election, the powers awarded to each 
branch constitute an important criterion of distinguishing between the two systems. The 
different combinations of the mode of election and the powers embedded in each 
branch, create a great deal of diversity among the intermediate models, which combine 
features of both models (Liphard, 1992: 3). 
The choice between parliamentarian and presidential systems has been one of the 
most fiercely debated issues in political science. Linz has forcefully advanced the 
virtues of parliamentarian in contrast to the perils of presidential systems. Among the 
most important advantages of parliamentarism are: greater propensities to resolve 
political crisis, which presidential systems suffer from; greater possibilities for 
representation versus presidential systems, where there is only one prize at stake and the  
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winner takes it; lack of the dual legitimacy problem, which occurs in the presidential 
systems where both the parliament and president claim legitimacy on the basis of their 
popular election (see Linz, 1990; Stephan and Skatch, 1993; Liphard, 1991). 
Both, Hungary and Bulgaria adopted parliamentary systems, yet their conception 
of parliamentarism differs considerably. How do their systems work? Were any of the 
formulas associated with  better performance?  
 
3.4.2.1 Overparliamentarism in Hungary  
The Hungarian constitution displays a clear preference for parliamentarism. In 
contrast with other post-communist constitutions, which refrain from using hierarchical 
qualifications, Hungary relegates popular sovereignty only to the parliament by 
stipulating    that “the national assembly is the supreme organ of state power and 
popular representation” (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 19, para. 1). In line with the 
inserted superiority of parliament versus other branches, the Hungarian parliament is 
given powers unmatched by its counterparts. The constitution inserts that the parliament 
“shall guarantee the constitutional order of society, and shall determine the structure, 
orientation and conditions of government” (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 19, para. 2). 
The parliament is also assigned the double role of both constituted and constituent 
power (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 19, para. 3). Moreover, the amendment rules, 
which require no other qualifications except of the approval by 2/3 of representatives, 
has led to a situation where parliament can modify the constitution without any 
difficulty.  
Vesting too much power in the parliament has been one of the most criticized 
dimensions of constitutional reform in Hungary.  First, easy amendment procedures 
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have blurred the separate function of ordinary legislation, constituent power and the 
power to amend the constitution. Second, Hungary’s strong parliament ended up 
becoming an almost supra-constitutional body. As Szikinger argues, 11 modifications to 
constitution since 1989 reflect the fact that the parliament possesses constitutional 
authority (2001: 415). Agh refers to the Hungarian system as overparliamentarization 
(Szikinger, 2001: 418). This is not to say, however, that there are not any principles out 
of the reach of parliaments. And by most accounts, the parliament’s power does not go 
unchecked to the extent it endangers the separation of powers principle.  
Regarding the relation between the parliament and the executive, two criteria are 
important: the mode of electing the government and the powers she is invested with. 
The Hungarian case displays a preference for strong and stable government according to 
both criteria. First, although the Prime Minister is elected by the majority of parliament 
upon the instigation of president (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 33, para. 3), the other 
member of the cabinet are appointed by the president at the suggestion of the Prime 
Minister (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 33, para. 4). As such, the ministers are 
accountable to parliament, but they are not subject to the vote of no confidence. 
Moreover, the Prime Minister can only be removed by a constructive vote of no 
confidence, which requires that no confidence motion be paralleled with the nomination 
of a new Prime Minister. In this context, the Prime Minister has a strong position vis a 
vis the parliament, which somehow balances the separation of powers. The April 1990 
amendments, especially curtailed the rights of the parliament by extending those of the 
government (Agh, 1995). 
 The power of the second element of the executive, the president, is more 
equivocal. He is elected by parliament, but he has been invested power not proportional 
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to the way of election.  In addition to the normal powers of president to represent the 
unity of the nation, he shall also “safeguard the democratic functioning of the state 
organization” (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 29, para. 1). The power of the president 
entails contradictory elements and collides with parliaments power to “guarantee the 
constitutional order of society”. The unclear allocation of such an essential function is 
likely to cause political conflicts, which do not serve democracy well.  
Other ambiguous powers of president are a broad range of emergency powers 
like the right to instigate legislation, to affect the convocation of the parliament and to 
initiate plebiscites, participation in determining foreign policy and important 
appointments (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 95-98). But, because the presidential 
powers are not that clear and often overlap with powers invested in other branches, they 
can hardly serve to balance the parliament or the governmental powers.  
The role of the president seems to gain some significance, especially vis a vis the 
government, if one takes into account the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court.  The prime minister has asked the Court, several times, about the rights and 
duties of the president. Court’s decisions and interpretations of the presidential powers 
have served to clarify the institutional framework of the separation of powers, to a 
considerable extent. In a conflict that rose between the president and the prime minister 
on the election of the high directors of media , for example, the Court confirmed the 
rights and duties of president to safeguard the democratic workings of institutions (Agh, 
1995: 310).      
Thus, while the roles of parliament, president and prime minister are separated 
and balanced, they suffer from some ambiguities, in which the constitutional provisions 
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have the largest share. The Constitutional Court is more or less a separate case and its 
role seems to have been clearly specified.  
The Constitutional court is not considered as part of the judiciary and it is 
regulated in a separate chapter, which ranks higher than the executive, but lower than 
the parliament. The court is also perceived to be beyond the power triangle, but 
influences their relationships in accordance with its duties to “contribute to the creation 
of state built on the rule of law, protect the constitutional order and safeguard the 
separation and balance of powers” (Agh, 1995: 315). 
To sum up, the Hungarian constitution displays some defects of over 
parliamentarization and internal inconsistencies in the allocation of power among 
different branches. However, it has, by and large, established an organic relation 
between the branches of government, which is well served by an independent and active 
constitutional court. 
  
 3.4.2.2 Separation of Powers in the Bulgarian Constitution  
 The Bulgarian constitution, like the Hungarian one, has clearly opted for a 
parliamentary system. Along the similarities, the Bulgarian system displays many 
differences in comparison to the Hungarian case. First, although its supremacy is 
guaranteed in the provisions of the basic law, the Bulgarian parliament has to share the 
distinction of “representing the people” with the popularly elected president, which is 
one of the restrictions against the unlimited power of parliament.  
 Second, the parliament seems to have much more limited constitutional powers 
given the different amendment procedures, which are set in the constitution. For certain 
amendments, the election of a special convention of the parliament, whose powers 
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expire after it has performed its task, is necessary (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 157, 
para. 62). Other amendments require an equally burdensome procedure, which requires 
the approval by ¾ of all members of the assembly in three ballots on three different 
days (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 154, para. 1). These extreme versions of deliberation 
requirements tend to make amendments almost prohibitively difficult. Consequently, 
contrary to the many amendments the Hungarian constitution has been subject to, the 
Bulgarian one has resisted any attempt of change.  
 Third, The Bulgarian constitution has also opted for a strong government, but the 
prime minister is weaker than his Hungarian counterpart. The prime minister is elected 
by the parliament upon the designation of the president. He needs only a simple 
majority of the representatives, present in parliament, to be elected (Hungarian 
Constitution, Art. 84, para. 6). While it is relatively easy to become prime minister, it is 
difficult for him to be called by the parliament because the vote of no confidence 
requires the absolute majority of all the members of parliament (Hungarian 
Constitution, Art. 89, para. 1). Similar to the Hungarian choice, Bulgaria’s prime 
minister is strengthened vis a vis parliament, by giving him the power to elect and 
dismiss the cabinet members, who are responsible to him (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 
84, para. 6). Although the ministers are accountable to parliament they are not subject to 
parliament’s vote of no confidence. As in Hungary, a vote of no confidence can be put 
into motion against the prime minister, but what weakens the position of the Bulgarian 
government is the lack of constructive element in the vote of no confidence.  
 Fourth, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, similar to the Hungarian one, is given 
independence out of the power triangle. The court is dealt with out of the chapter of 
judicial power. It is also empowered with the right of constitutional review, which 
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serves to maintain the supremacy of constitution over the legislative, government and 
even people (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 149, para. 1). The main task is to maintain 
the principle of check and balances between the interested actors, which is reflected in 
the selection of the judges: 1/3 are elected by the parliament, 1/3 by the justices of the 
supreme courts and 1/3 by the president (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 147). The 
Bulgarian Court, however, falls short of the extended powers given to the Hungarian 
one Most importantly, the individual citizens do not have access to the court, which has 
led Elster, Offe and Preuss to argue that the Bulgarian Court is “more a government 
tribunal with specific competencies in the sphere of government” (1998: 104). 
 Fifth, the popular election of the Bulgarian president is a feature of departure 
from the pure parliamentarian system of Hungary, where the president is elected by the 
parliament. However, this mode of election has not created a presidential or even semi-
presidential system because of the shortage of powers the president is invested with. 
Actually, as in the Hungarian case, there is ambiguity with regard to the presidential 
powers. While the Hungarian president is over empowered given his mode of election, 
the Bulgarian one is bestowed few powers comparing to his popular election. He has 
some competencies in designating the prime minister, but his right is subject to many 
additional qualifications. In case of political crisis he has to dissolve the parliament and 
appoint a caretaker government, being refused any discretion to resolve the crisis 
(Hungarian Constitution, Art. 99, para. 5). His major power vis a vis the parliament is 
his right to veto parliamentary bills. But, because the majority members can overrule 
the presidential veto it is essentially suspensive (Hungarian Constitution, Art. 101). The 
powers of president vis a vis government is equally weak, as most of his strategic 
appointments require the countersignature of the prime minister.  
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   Thus, Bulgaria’s regime displays a weaker parliament comparing to the 
Hungarian case. The supremacy of constitution is strongly put forth in the form of 
almost prohibitively difficult amendment procedures. One of the problems of the 
constitutional document lies in the discrepancy between the legitimacy of president 
deriving from the way of his popular election and relatively weak competencies and 
means to involve in politics. But, Bulgarian constitution has also succeeded in creating 
a system of check and balances among the three branches of government.  
 
3.5 The Gap Between Constitutional Premises and Reality in the Process of 
Implementation 
The analysis of both Hungarian and Bulgarian constitution texts suggest that, in 
spite of some ambiguities, they have, by and large, succeeded to adopt a rich catalogue 
of human tights and to curb political power. Legally speaking, both constitutions 
embody the best of the liberal constitutional tradition, thus imparting their regimes with 
the essential democratic credentials –human rights and a system of check and balances. 
The first level of constitutional performance, thus, enables us to conclude that both 
constitutions provide legal frames adequate to the necessary requirements of a 
democratic polity. But, were the democratic credentials of those legal texts translated in 
a democratic system? Did the ‘good’ institutional design work ‘good’ in practice? In 
short, does the reality conform to constitutional provisions?  
While constitutions, in both countries under study, provided promising rules in 
terms of democratization we should still evaluate their implementation. Because 
democratization is a social project in addition to an institutional one, the people who 
experience them can best evaluate the performance of rules in reality. Moreover, 
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people’s evaluations have a stronger propensity to truth because they bypass 
institutions’ or political actors’ interest to show that they are doing well 
In nowadays political systems people experience the performance of democratic 
institutions in a multiplicity of ways, which does not necessarily generate homogenous 
evaluations. People may experience differently, hence evaluate differently the extent to 
which authorities respect their human rights promised in constitution, the extent to 
which the government represents its constituents, the extent to which they can influence 
the government, the extent to which their officials operate within the democratic rules 
etc. Because of the limited scope of this paper I will focus on two indicators: Trust to 
particular institutions and the extent to which public officials operate within the rule of 
law. I will use the New European Barometer data collected by interviewing large 
representative samples of citizens across all post communist countries.12  
 
3.5.1 Trust in Parliaments and Courts  
As argued in the second part, both Hungarian and Bulgarian constitutions have 
opted for parliamentarian systems, where the parliament is the central organ of the 
democratic polity. In both countries parliaments have legislative functions, control 
governments through the election of the prime minister and the vote of no confidence, 
and perform other essential functions. Moreover, they are the main representative body 
directly elected by people, thus standing for the main democratic achievements of the 
post-communist transformations.  
                                                 
12 Centre for the study of public policy New Europe Barometer, 2001 
http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/index.html?catalog20_0.html 
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26% of the Bulgarians, trust more to the parliament than to other institutions like 
parties, courts and police. In Hungary, only 16% trust more to the parliament than to the 
other institutions (New European Barometer, table 3). Low support for parliament, in 
Hungary, may be explained with some observers’ critiques towards the 
overparliamentarisation process, which can be traced in the easy amendment 
procedures; exclusion of interest groups from the decision-making process; exclusion of 
small parties from parliamentary representation; and domination of partisan debates 
(Szikinger, 2001: 414-417). In the Hungarian case people’s evaluations conform to 
constitutionalists critical position on the very strong parliament’s impact in the 
Hungarian political life.  
Both constitutions have also established constitutional courts, whose major 
function is safeguarding the constitutional principles through constitutional review. In a 
comparative basis, however, the Hungarian court seem to have a superior position with 
regard to its independence from the power triangle, the broad range of functions, and 
the active position the court has taken on many political issues. More importantly, the 
right of citizens to appeal to the court seems to have raised its credibility as expressed 
by 36% of the respondents who support parliament more than any other institution. 
The Bulgarian court is also guaranteed independence from other branches of 
state and has adopted an active role in politics. Especially the refusal of the court to 
declare unconstitutional the party of ethnic Turks is seen as a prove of Courts 
independence and political maturity (Ganev, 2002: 199-200). However, the weaker 
position of the Bulgarian court comparing to the Hungarian one, may explain why only 
24% of Bulgarians trust their court comparing to 36% of Hungarians that do so (New 
European Barometer, table 3).  
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People’s evaluations on the performance of both parliaments and courts, in the 
form of trust in these constitutions, reflect the impact the constitutional provisions have 
on political life. People’s evaluations on their parliament and courts, in both our cases, 
conform to the hypothetical relation between parliamentarian systems and 
democratization. The choice to strengthen parliament vis a vis other institutions has 
been translated in an effective institution, which is trusted from the people.   
 
3.5.2 Governing Without the Rule of Law 
The gap between rules and their application seem to be more important when 
considering executive’s performance. People across the region have low esteem for the 
honesty of their public officials, which is also reflected in the answers of the Hungarian 
and Bulgarian respondents. An absolute majority, 74% of the interviewed Bulgarians, 
think that most or almost all public officials take bribes or are corrupt in other forms. 
The percentage of Bulgarians is higher comparing to 54% of the Hungarians that 
believe their officials are corrupted (New European Barometer, table 1).   
Ganev explains the paradoxical discrepancy between the successful installation 
of pre-fixed rules and vulnerability of Bulgaria’s system to corruption, by inserting that 
institutional engineering is a multifaceted social project, which has not yet impacted the 
Bulgarian elites (2001: 208).  Constitutional provisions, laws and institutions are 
constantly ignored given the extraordinary profit incentives that post-communist 
transition fosters. Opportunities to strike it rich during a period of chaotic privatization, 
license of private banks operating with state money and similar occasions, all 
concentrated in the hands of the elected officials, provide a context favorable to the 
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looting of state resources. In addition to the context the behavior of elites seem to be 
foreign to the ethics of good governing.  
Thus, it seems that constitutional rules have little impact on the behavior of 
government officials, which is the main obstacle to democratization. In addition to free 
elections and political rights and liberties, consolidation of democracy requires a 
government that obeys laws and is not steeped in corruption. Creating incentives for 
good behavior and good governance, however, is beyond the influence of constitutions.  
The poor performance of current regimes, in terms of the rule of law, inhibits 
popular support, thus undermining prospects for democratic consolidation. Survey data 
shows that Bulgarians, who are exposed to the most corrupted system, have lower 
support for their regime. Only 59% of Bulgarians, comparing to 76% of Hungarians 
support their current regime (New European Barometer, table 2).   
The correlation between trust to their officials and support for the regime seem to 
extend to the correlation less corruption more support for the future regime. While, 59% 
of the Bulgarians support the current regime, a lower percentage of 58% are expected to 
support the future regime. Hungary, which displays smaller scale problems with 
corruption, shows more optimistic tendencies. 87% of the Hungarian respondents are 
expected to support the future regime, while 76% support the current one. (New 
European Barometer, table 2). 
Thus, people’s evaluations on the performance of rules in practice show that a 
good constitutional design does not have magical consequences. In spite of their 
democratic constitutions, both Hungary and Bulgaria are vulnerable to corruption and 
elite’s looting behavior, which decreases support for the democratic regime and is likely 
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to do so in the future. Both our case studies point to the limited capacities of 
constitutions to effect the democratization process.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
Both cases under study have opted for parliamentarian systems, which are 
attached more democratic credentials comparing to the presidential systems. They have 
also adopted extensive bills of rights and have regulated the separation of the three 
branches of government according to the principle of check and balances. Although, 
these constitutions are not free of problems, they by and large have imparted their 
respective regimes with the main characteristics of democratic systems.  
However, both cases show that there is a discrepancy between the constitutional 
provisions in letter and the reality of their application. Measured by the evaluation of 
people’s experiences with their democratic institutions, constitutions proved to matter to 
the extent they have created strong parliaments and courts which are among the most 
trusted institutions  in both Hungary and Bulgaria. Popular trust in their public officials, 
on the other hand, is quite low in both the countries, but extremely low in Bulgaria, 
where only 25% of the respondents believe their officials are not corrupt. Support for 
current as well as future regime, consequently, is much lower in Bulgaria than in 
Hungary. Thus, problems with corruption and looting of state resources remained out of 
the reach of constitutional rules. These problems undermine support of democracy 
inhibiting the process of democratic consolidation. 
 This chapter suggests that because democratization is a multifaceted social 
project constitutions matter but not always.  Good constitutions do not necessarily 
translate in good policies. Therefore, in addition to ‘good’ constitutions, democracy 
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requires incentives for good governance. As long as post-communist countries fail to 
regulate the behavior of elites in accordance with the rule of law, the whole project of 
democratic consolidation remains an open ended question 
 
3.7 Tables 
Table 1   CORRUPTION AND BRIBE-TAKING SEEN AS WIDESPREAD                                    
(% thinking most or almost all public officials take bribes, are corrupt)   
Lithuania    95% 
Latvia     92  
Romania    89 
Slovakia    80 
Bulgaria    74 
Poland               69 
Czech Republic   66 
Estonia               63 
Hungary    54 
Slovenia    42 
    (New Europe mean)  (73)    
                                                                                                     
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy New Europe Barometer, 2001; New 
Russia Barometer, 2001. 
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Table 2    ATTITUDES TOWARD OLD AND NEW REGIMES AND THE FUTURE   
    Old regime Current system     Future 
      (% positive) 
Czech Republic   31  76  83 
Slovenia    64  75  73 
Hungary    68  76  87 
Estonia                61  69  81 
Bulgaria    57  59  58 
Latvia     63  53  74 
Romania    55  50  62 
Lithuania    55  46  54 
Slovakia    61  39  49 
    (New Europe mean)  (58)   (61)  (68)                   
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Table 3   TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS                                           
   Parliament  Parties   Courts            Police 
      (% trusting) 
Bulgaria   26  25  24  31  
Czech Republic  20  21  34  40 
Poland                20    8  15  21 
Hungry               16  14  36  29 
Romania   13   9  19  36 
Slovenia   10   8  26  24 
Estonia                10   8  26  30 
Lithuania    9   8  16  19 
Latvia      8   7  24  27 
Slovakia    8   9  15  26 
 (New Europe mean) (14)  (12)  (25)  (28)                                  
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy New Europe Barometer (2001) and New 
Russia Barometer (2001). Trust: persons give institution a rating of 4 to 7 on a seven-point 
scale.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study is an effort to analyze the impact of constitutions on democratization. 
In the theoretical part I look at why and how constitutions effect democratization, 
especially given the volatile socio-economic and political environments, characteristic of 
post-communist countries. The empirical study of constitution-making, constitutional 
design and its implementation, in the cases of both Bulgaria and Hungary, shows the 
limits of constitutions in engineering political systems.  
This study suggests that, because democratization is a multifaceted project, 
constitutions by themselves can not produce a workable democracy.  Constitutions did 
not bring a fundamental change in the way in which Eastern European societies were 
governed and did not induce respect for the rule of law among governing elites. 
However, constitutions did prove to be a crucial asset to democratization: they were 
indispensable in structuring the new governments and spelling out a catalogue of basic 
rights. Thus, certain processes and certain products guarantee better prospects for 
democratization, but they do not ensure a smooth democracy building process.     
Certain constitutions are more amenable to this process than others. One of the 
consensual arguments of constitutionalists is that liberal constitutions share two main 
principles -the separation and balance of powers among the branches of government and 
a bill of fundamental rights, while providing mechanisms for the realization of those 
provisions in reality.  Thus, democratic credentials of constitutions depend to the extent 
they encompass these principles and appropriate mechanisms to defend them. 
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Most students of democracy advocate constitutional restraints on the basis that it 
prevents both the majority and the passionate demos to overturn democratic principles 
and procedures embedded in constitution; it insures people’s representatives do not 
betray their electorates; they provide the fundamental rules of the polity, which enable 
democracy. The transition processes seem to foster the need for constitutional 
constraints because of the difficulty of simultaneous economic, social and political 
transformations, the institutional vacuum, and the logic of transition. Given the 
uncertainty of transition, the impersonal, rational, legal, legitimate and unquestioned 
protection of democratic principles assist democratization because they provide the light 
at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, the post-communist transition is one of the rare 
constitutional moments, which carries the spirit of the democratic revolution, thus an 
opportunity that democratic aspirations become a permanent feature of Eastern Europe.  
Consequently, ‘good’ constitutions can smooth the path of political process to 
democracy because it is not left to chance, reflection or choice.  In addition to the 
ambitious claim of democracy, constitutions can induce a set of democratic friendly 
political trends, whose not exhaustive list would be stability, discretion, continuity, 
normality, possibility of redefinition of the rules, and virtue economizing. But, how does 
it work in practice? How are constitutions made? How good they are? And, how are they 
implemented? 
Both Hungary and Bulgaria chose to freeze certain features of the new regimes in 
their new constitutions.  The mode of extrication proved to be an important factor in the 
process of constitution-making to the extent that it determined the political actors and 
their negotiating power input in the process. The mature post- totalitarianist regime in 
Hungary dictated the option of negotiated transition, while early post-totalitarianism in 
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Bulgaria was translated in a controlled transition dominated by the former communist 
elite.  
The RTT, which set up the macro choices of the new regimes, in which the meso 
and micro–choices left to contitution–makers had to fit in, were the most important 
transitory institutions to effect the constitution–making process. The Bulgarian RTT, 
organized and directed by the communist regime elites, created more space for the 
realization of their interests while the Hungarian RTT established more neutral 
provisions given the power and the united opposition, which contravened regime 
reformers.  Both RTT, however, started the irreversible process of democratization by 
agreeing upon a peaceful, evolutive, legal, but progressive and determined transition; 
and negotiating the basic constitutional arrangements and the date of the first elections.   
Aspects of the constitution making process in our case studies, can hardly be 
attached definite legitimizing roles because opposite choices did not produce very 
different consequences in terms of democratization. Bulgaria’s choice to adopt a brand 
new constitution within 18 months has injected stability and predictability in the very 
volatile post-communist environment; has stimulated some democratic behavior and a 
minimum of respect for the rule of law among elites by institutionalizing incentives for 
their behavior; has specified and balanced the roles of each branch of government; and, 
has enhanced democratic inclusion in terms of accepting a broad array of individual and 
minority rights.  Thus, by designing roles and practices, the Bulgarian constitution has 
provided a crucial scaffolding in support of the new evolving institutional practices. 
However, the constitution still bears the mark of hastily agreed upon provisions and 
arrangements. The Hungarian constitution, on the other hand, manifests a dubious 
legitimacy. The RTT simply amended the communist constitution and passed the 
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amendments within a non–elected parliament. Compared to the Bulgarian case where a 
special constitutive assembly was created with the purpose of drafting the new 
constitution, the Hungarian case is lacking in legitimacy. The Hungarian choice to adopt 
an interim constitution seem to have prolonged the constitution–making process 
indefinitely, but it proved to be a successful pliable framework to cope with the 
challenges of transition. And, it allowed time for long–term negotiations, which can 
help to establish a more stable document.   Thus, our findings on the democratic 
credentials associated with certain processes of constitution–making are not conclusive, 
but it is certain that adopting new constitutions assisted democratization, because these 
constitutions provide people with a plethora of fundamental rights, have curbed political 
power through the separation and balance of powers, and have created institutional 
incentives for democratic practices.  
But, are there any problems with the constitutional design? How ‘good’ are the 
constitutions in terms of providing mechanisms to ensure the realization of their 
principles and avoiding overlapping and contradictions among the constitutional 
provisions? 
Both our case studies have encompassed a rich array of human rights and have 
imparted their regimes with mechanisms to protect them like the constitutional courts 
and the ombudsmen. A problematic trend concerning human rights provisions is the 
extension of the negative rights to positive rights, which involve government 
interference, thus shift the authority of implementation from courts to the executive. 
But, this has hardly effected the constitutional option to bless the new regimes with 
human rights that carry the best of the liberal constitutions’ tradition.  
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Concerning the separation and balance of powers, both our cases have adopted 
parliamentarian systems, seen as more democratic compared to the presidential systems. 
The Hungarian case displays signs of overparliamentarisation and both cases include 
overlaps among the powers assigned to the parliament and executive, especially the 
president. But, by and large, both countries have opted for a system of separation and 
balance of powers.  
The next issue, which intends to complete our argument on the complexity of the 
correlation between constitutions and democratization is the extent to which 
constitutional provisions are obeyed in reality. Measured through people’s evaluations 
on the working of their institutions, constitutional provisions seem to have been 
effective in creating strong parliaments and courts, which are the most trusted 
institutions in both Hungary and Bulgaria. Popular trust in the executive and their 
officials, however, is quite low in both our cases but extremely low in Bulgaria, where 
problems with corruption and looting of state resources remain out of the constitutional 
principles’ reach. Survey data shows that because of the lack of respect for the rule of 
law among the ruling elites, the gap between constitutional devices and their application 
is quite large. As one of the fundamental principles of democracy, failure or success to 
induce respect for the rule of law seems to be the main challenge of the future. And, 
good governing based on rule of law is out of constitutional range.   
Thus, constitutions matter, but they have limited capacities in engineering their 
political systems. Certain processes and certain products guarantee better prospects for 
democratization, but they do not ensure a smooth democracy building process. 
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